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INTRODUCTION

Automobile insurance in West Virginia is pervasive. Every car
registered in this state must have, at a minimum, liability and uninsured motorist coverage. Nationally, and statewide, the automobile
insurance industry has grown almost as quickly as the number of cars

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol97/iss3/5

2

Cady and Smith: West Virginia's Automobile Insurance Policy Laws: A Practitioner'

1995]

AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICY LAWS

produced each year.' With the growth of automobile insurance companies and the enactment of state statutes covering insurance company
operations, automobile insurance policy law has grown more complex
and convoluted.
This Article provides a roadmap of the automobile insurance policy laws of the State of West Virginia from a practitioner's perspective.
Our purpose is to clarify the statutory laws governing automobile insurance policies in this state, and to provide some background for the
common law interpretations of these statutes. This Article should provide a basic guide to the practice of automobile insurance policy law
in the state of West Virginia where policy interpretation and statutory
reference are at issue. This Article undertakes the first comprehensive
analysis of automobile insurance policy law in this state and, as such,
is written as a guide to the basic aspects of each element of the law.
Part Two of this Article details the history of the development of
automobile insurance, including a brief history of insurance law in the
United States and in West Virginia. Automobile liability insurance is
discussed in Part Three, which assesses the mandatory liability insurance provisions required by statutory law essential to a basic understanding of the rights and responsibilities of West Virginia's automobile liability insurance companies. Part Four explores the statutory and
common law requirements for medical payments (MEDPAY) insurance
coverage. Uninsured motorist (UM) coverage is the subject of Part
Five, which analyzes the mandatory coverage requirements and the
numerous common law mandates for uninsured motorist coverage. And
finally, Part Six explores the underinsured motorist (UIM) provisions
of state law, and includes a definitional guide to the mandatory offer
requirement of UIM insurance.

1. The gasoline powered automobile was developed in Europe by Etienne Lenoir in
1860. In 1893, J. Frank and Charles E. Duryea produced the first successful gasoline-powered automobile in the United States. They began commercial production of this model in
1896, the same year in which Henry Ford produced his first successful model in Detroit.
Mass production of the automobile began in 1901 by Ransom E. Olds, whose company
manufactured more than 400 "Oldsmobiles" in the first year of production. Automobile,
COMPTON'S ENCYCLOPEDIA 134-36 (1994).
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This Article presents with a survey of West Virginia's automobile
insurance policy laws, and should serve as a springboard for further
research and practice in this field.

II.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE LAW

In 1991, there were 168,995,000 licensed drivers in the United
States.' Of these licensed drivers, in that same year, there were an
estimated 31,300,000 motor vehicle accidents.3 As the number of licensed drivers increases, so does the need for automobile insurance.4
Where did the need for automobile insurance start? Why did an
automobile insurance system develop rather than a personal responsibility system? While the complete answers to these questions are beyond
the scope of this Article, what follows is a basic introduction to the
development of automobile insurance policy law. This background
should provide some insight into the purposes of insurance law and the
reasons for its development.
A.

Why Insurance?

In the United States, the right to redress from injuries sustained in
an automobile accident has primarily been based on an allocation of
fault.5 This right of redress is predicated on the notion that the negligent party should pay for the damages to the injured party or property
caused by the tortfeasor's negligence.6 The majority of motorists
choose to obviate the economic risk of accidents by purchasing auto-

2. ALAN I. WIDISS, UNINSURED & UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE xxi (2d ed.

1992).
3. Iot
4. For example, in 1980, there were more than 100,000,000 licensed drivers in the
United States. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1993,
No. 1018, p. 616 (113th ed. 1993). In that same year, 24,000,000 were involved in at least
one motor vehicle accident during that year. Id., No. 1027, at 620. This is an increase of
7,300,000 accidents over an eleven year period.
5. WIDISS, supra note 2, at 3. See W. J. Heyting, Automobiles and Compulsory Liability Insurance, 16 A.B.A. J. 362 (1930), for a discussion of early financial responsibility
laws.
6. WDiss, supra note 2, at 3.
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mobile liability insurance. Additionally, insurance can be purchased
which covers the risk of an accident caused by a "financially irresponsible" motorist - an uninsured or underinsured motorist who is unable
to pay the cost of his or her own negligence, and who has failed to
secure enough automobile liability insurance for that purpose.
B. Development of the Law in the United States
The problem of financial irresponsibility and the need for automobile insurance dates from the beginning of the mass production of
automobiles in the early 1900s.' Initially, automobile insurance policies
were "voluntary" policies. Under the voluntary system, insureds voluntarily contracted for an insurance policy to cover any expenses which
might arise from future automobile accidents. Because insurance was
not mandatory, these policies were exempt from regulation.' The
Fourth Circuit outlined its stance on "voluntary" versus "mandatory"
insurance policies in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Cooper,9 holding that where a policy was issued to the named insured
on his own request, and not issued pursuant to a state statute, the policy was not regulated by that statute. Thus, voluntary insurance policies
created a contractual relationship between the insured and the insurance
company which was not governed by state automobile insurance statutes.
In the mid-1920s, automobile insurance shifted from a "voluntary"
system to a "certified" system, as states sought to protect the victims
of highway accidents by securing their right to compensation."0 The

7. Id at 4.
8. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 233 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1956). For
other examples of "voluntary" policy decisions, see McCann v. Continental Casualty, 128
N.E.2d 624 (Il. 1955) (involving a private passenger car, wherein the court held that the
state's financial responsibility law was not applicable due to the private contracting of the
insurance policy); Gray v. Rich, 152 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Il1. 1957) (holding that a privately
contracted policy, voluntarily entered, was not subject to the state's financial responsibility
law); Perkins v. Perkins, 284 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955) (holding that the Missouri
Motor Vehicle Liability Act had no effect unless the insurance policy involved was required
under that act).
9. Cooper, 233 F.2d at 500.
10. See Joseph P. Murphy & Ross D. Netherton, Public Responsibility and the Unin-
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first legislation enacted was the Connecticut Financial Responsibility
Law of 1925." Specifically, if the accident was one causing death,
personal injury, or property damages in excess of one hundred dollars,
the Connecticut law authorized the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to
require an operator of a motor vehicle to prove his "financial responsibility to satisfy any claim for damages, by reason of personal injury to,
or death of, any person, of at least ten thousand dollars."'" If a motorist was unable to produce such proof of financial responsibility, the
or could
Commissioner could suspend the motorist's vehicle registration
3
motorist.
that
for
vehicle
subsequent
any
refuse to register
This initial attempt at state regulation of motorists provided power
for the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to regulate dangerous drivers,
but only after the motorist had been involved in an accident. Additionally, the injured driver had to file a complaint with the Commissioner's
office in order to gain recourse under the tortfeasor's automobile insurance policy. This meant that the dangerous motorist would go unnoticed by the Commissioner unless he was reported to the
Commissioner's office by the injured party.'"
In 1925, proponents of "compulsory" insurance secured a victory
in the State of Massachusetts with the enactment of a compulsory insurance requirement in that state. 5 The Massachusetts Act required all
motorists to secure automobile insurance as a prerequisite to vehicle
registration. Massachusetts remained the only state to require compulsory automobile insurance prior to vehicle registration for the next thirty
years. "6
sured Motorist, 47 GEo. L.J. 700 (1959), for a detailed history of the evolution of coverage
terms and the scope of protection given by insurance companies. Most of the early legislation induced motorists to obtain insurance coverage if they lacked the personal financial
resources to satisfy a major damage claim.
11. 1925 Conn. Pub. Acts 183. This statute encouraged motorists to obtain automobile
insurance to cover excess damages, and threatened motorists with a suspension of driving
privileges in the event that they were unable to prove that they could pay claims which
could arise from their negligence.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See WIDISS, supra note 2, at 5.
15. 1925 Mass. Acts 346. Although enacted in 1925, the compulsory insurance requirement did not actually take effect in Massachusetts until 1927.
16. WIDISS, supra note 2, at 5. From 1925 to 1965, only New York in 1956, see
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In New Hampshire in 1937, and then later in many other states,
legislatures began to require that all persons involved in accidents be
able to offer proof of their financial responsibility to pay claims up to
the limits required by each state's laws. 7 This approach became
known as a "security-type" approach, and was the forerunner of modem automobile insurance legislation in the United States.'" Because
proof of ability to pay was required after an accident occurred, these
"security-type" laws induced the prudent driver to obtain automobile
liability insurance, at least in the minimum amount specified by each
state's laws.'9
The difference between compulsory and "security-type" insurance
is that "security-type" insurance requires security only after an accident
has occurred, or where the operator is classified as a "habitual offender. 20° The typical compulsory insurance statute requires that automobile liability insurance be purchased as a condition precedent to the
issuance of valid license plates and the registration of the automobile.2' West Virginia and a majority of states follow the compulsory
approach to automobile insurance.
C. Development of the Law in West Virginia
Effective October 1, 1981, West Virginia became a compulsory
insurance state, requiring that all motorists show proof of liability insurance in order to register a motor vehicle. 2 West Virginia Code §
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 312 (McKinney 1960), and North Carolina in 1957, see N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 20-309 to -319 (Supp. 1957), enacted comparable compulsory requirements.
17. 1927 N.H. Laws § 54.1.
18. Murphy & Netherton, supra note 10, at 706.
19. WiDISS, supra note 2, at 8. The minimum amounts of coverage required under
state financial responsibility laws vary in range from 5/10 to 25/50 (representing respectively,
bodily injury per person/bodily injury per accident - property damage per accident in units
of thousands of dollars). Id.
20. JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §
4299, at 302 (1994).
21. Id. The validity of such a condition precedent rests on the notion of state police
power, and has been upheld as valid by the Supreme Court. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535 (1971) (holding that a statute which bars issuance of licenses to all motorists who do
not carry liability insurance or who do not post security does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment).
22. W. VA. CODE § 17D-4-1 to -26 (1991 & Supp. 1994); W. VA. CODE § 17D-2A-1
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17D-4-2 provides a minimum liability coverage requirement for all
automobile liability policies: $20,000 per person; $40,000 per accident;
and $10,000 property damage. West Virginia first required that all
motorists carry an uninsured motorist policy (UMv) in 1967, and that
requirement is still mandatory for all state motorists.24 Additionally,
West Virginia requires that all automobile insurance companies offer an
optional underinsured motorist (UIM) policy to all insureds; such coverage may be waived by the insured, but the initial offer is a mandatory requirement by statute.25
III. LIABILITY INSURANCE
Liability insurance is the basic coverage in the West Virginia automobile insurance policy and covers tort damages of the automobileinjured party. The purpose of liability insurance is to provide a means
of compensation for victims of automobile accidents.26 West Virginia
requires that all drivers carry at least a minimum amount
of automobile
' 27
5
responsibility.
financial
of
proof
"as
liability insurance
As of July 1, 1994, there were 1,181,210 passenger vehicles registered in West Virginia.28 All of the operators of these vehicles had to
provide proof of liability insurance before the vehicles could be registered in this state. The required provisions of a standard automobile
liability insurance policy, the steps to recovery on such a liability policy, and the persons covered under a such a liability policy are discussed in detail below.

(1991).
23. W. VA. CODE § 17D-4-2 (1991).
24. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31 (1992). West Virginia first required UM coverage on

June 6, 1967. The initial UM minimum required amount was 10/20/5 (in thousands). In
1979, the amount was raised to 20/40/10 (in thousands). From 1982 to 1988, UM coverage
was elective if the insured waived such coverage in writing; however, in 1988, UM cover-

age was once again made mandatory by the legislature in its regular session.
25. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31 (1992). UIM coverage has been optional in West Virginia since
26.
27.
28.
Virginia

1982.
W. VA. CODE § 17D-4-12 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
W. VA. CODE § 17D-4-12(a) (1991 & Supp. 1994).
Telephone Interview with Steven Dale, Department of Motor Vehicles of West
(Mar. 16, 1995).
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A. Mandatory Coverage Under Statutory Law
Effective on October 1, 1981, the West Virginia Motor Vehicle
Safety Responsibility Act (WVMVSRA) required all motor vehicle

owners in the state to obtain liability insurance coverage for all automobiles operated by West Virginia residents.29 By making liability
insurance mandatory, West Virginia has joined the majority of states

which require a mandatory level of minimum liability insurance coverage for every driver on the road.3" This compulsory insurance requirement followed the precedent established by Massachusetts in 1925.31

The mandatory requirement for automobile liability insurance is set
forth in West Virginia Code § 17D-4-2.32 All drivers are required to

29. W. VA. CODE § 17D-2A-1 (1991). The WVMVSRA reads as follows: "The purpose of this article is to promote the public welfare by requiring every owner or registrant
of a motor vehicle licensed in this State to maintain certain security during the registration
period for such vehicle." Id. The WVMVSRA requires that all vehicles registered in the
State of West Virginia be covered by an insurance policy which meets the state's minimum
standards for coverage.
For an interpretation of the legislative intent behind the WVMVSRA, see Myers v.
Cline, 437 S.E.2d 267 (W. Va. 1993) (holding that the WVMVSRA is designed to require
mandatory coverage for motor vehicles owned in this state); Jones v. Motorists Mut. Ins.
Co., 356 S.E.2d 634 (W. Va. 1987) (holding that the legislature did not intend that the
WVMVSRA protect a named insured's property from destruction by a teenage driver).
30. Twenty-six states, including West Virginia, and two United States territories make
automobile liability insurance compulsory. APPLEMAN, supra note 20, § 4299, at 301 (1994).
See CAL. VEH. CODE § 16020 (West 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-4-705 (Supp. 1994);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38-327 (1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2118 (Supp. 1994); FLA.
STAT. ch. 627.733 (1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-3403b (1994); HAW. REV. STAT. §
431:10C-308 (Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE § 49-233 (1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3104
(1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.39-080 (Baldwin 1994); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66 2 , §
7-101 (1994); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § IA (Law. Co-op. 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
500.3101 (Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. § 65B.48 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-6-301
(1994); NEV. REV. STAT. § 698.190 (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-3 (West Supp. 1994);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-218 (Michie Supp. 1994); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 312
(McKinney 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-310 (Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-41-04
(1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 7-601 (West 1994); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §
1009.104 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.119 (Law. Co-op. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. §
31-41-4 (1994); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 9, § 2064 (1994); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 701
(1994).
31. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
32. Liability insurance and "proof of financial responsibility" requirements are covered
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prove an "ability to respond in damages for liability, on account of
accident occurring subsequent to the effective date of said proof, aris-

ing out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor
vehicle ..
."" The liability policy must cover, at minimum, $20,000
for the death or personal injury of any one person in any one accident;
$40,000 for the bodily injury or death of two or more persons in any
one accident; and $10,000 for the injury or destruction of property of
others in any one accident. 4
Additionally, the state has established the West Virginia Automobile Insurance Plan (WVAIP) 5 The WVAIP is an assigned risk pool

in which all companies that write automobile insurance in West Virginia are required to participate. 6 In short, the WVAIP spreads the risk
of bad drivers across the entire pool of insurance providers so that
"bad risk" drivers can procure the minimum level of insurance coverage. 7 West Virginia Code § 33-20-15 outlines the purpose of the
WVAIP, and allows agreements to be made among insurers "with
respect to the equitable apportionment among them of insurance which
may be afforded applicants who are in good faith entitled to but who
are unable to procure such insurance through ordinary methods."38
WVAIP limits coverage to the "operation, maintenance and use" of
the insured automobile. 9 In D & M Logging Co. v. Huffman,4" the

in W. VA. CODE §§ 17D-4-1 to -26 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
33. W. VA. CODE § 17D-4-2 (1991). See West Virginia Compulsory Motor Vehicle

Liability Insurance Regulations, Informational Letter No. 22 (Jan. 1984) for a recital of the
Department of Insurance regulations and sample insurance forms.
34. W. VA. CODE § 17D-4-2 (1991). These requirements are generally referred to as

the "20/40/10 split limits requirement"
35. W. VA. CODE §§ 33-20-15, 33-20A-1 to -7 (1992) (outlining the statutory requirements for the WVAIP).'See D & M Logging Co. v. Huffinan, 427 S.E.2d 244 (W. Va.
1993), for a description of how the WVAIP operates.
36. Huffman, 427 S.E.2d at 246.
37. Id. With the risk of bad or high risk drivers spread over the entire pool of West
Virginia's automobile insurance agencies, insurers are more willing to write policies for these
drivers because the individual insurance agency loses less money on the overall claims filed.
38. W. VA. CODE § 33-20-15 (1992). Any rates approved by the insurance groups are
subject to approval by the State Insurance Commissioner. See also W. VA. CODE §§ 3320A-1 to -7 (1992) for additional WVAIP requirements.
39. Huffman, 427 S.E.2d at 246. In Huffman, the court held that a business automobile liability policy on a truck did not insure the truck owner because that truck had a
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court outlined the parameters of the WVAIP. To expand the assignedrisk coverage under WVAIP beyond "operation, maintenance and use,"
would unnecessarily increase the exposure of insurance companies and
would impose an undue hardship on many West Virginians, who cannot obtain automobile insurance but for the WVAIP, through increased
insurance premiums." Huffman held that the language of the insurance
contract governs the coverage parameters under a WVAIP policy, as
long as the specified coverage is not contradictory of the "operation,
maintenance and use" language in the statute and meets the mandatory
minimum coverage requirements.42
B. Cancellation and Non-Renewal
Because automobile liability insurance is mandatory, the insurance
companies' cancellation and non-renewal of insurance policies must be
limited. 3 In Paxton v. Allstate Insurance Co.,44 the southern district
court held that insurers can cancel an insurance policy only for those
reasons expressly outlined in the controlling statute.45 West Virginia
crane attached to it for the purpose of loading logs onto another truck. WVAIP coverage is
limited to the operation, maintenance or use of the insured automobile when that vehicle is
being used as an automobile - not when being used as a crane. Id.
40. Id. at 244.
41. Id. at 247. WVAIP does not require insurance companies to insure activities involving specialized equipment (such as cranes) because this is the function of a general
liability policy; the WVAIP covers only automobiles, as the WVAIP's function is to provide
automobile liability insurance.
42. Id. The court held that the truck involved was covered by the policy, when used
as an automobile, but the attached crane was not covered as the policy expressly excluded
it. This exclusion of coverage was held valid because the use of the crane on a stationary
truck did not constitute an "operation, maintenance or use" of the truck as an automobile.
Id.
43. Cancellation and non-renewal of automobile insurance policies are controlled by W.
VA. CODE §§ 33-6A-1 to -5 (1992 & Supp. 1994).
44. 663 F. Supp. 99 (S.D. W. Va. 1987).
45. In Paxton, the court reasoned that a policy-holder should not be expected to know
that legal recourse is available when a policy is canceled; rather, an ordinary individual
would most likely assume that the cancellation was valid and obtain substitute insurance.
The statutory language is controlling precisely because the insurance company's knowledge
of the insured's rights is greater than the average insured; the controlling statute establishes
an affirmative duty on the part of insurance carriers to maintain a policy unless one of the
statutory exceptions allowing cancellation is present. Id. at 100.
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Code § 33-6A-1 establishes the allowable reasons for insurance policy
cancellation.46 Additionally, statutory law requires that the insurance
company may not cancel a policy without giving the insured thirty-day
notice of the company's intention to cancel.4 7
A violation of W. Va. Code § 33-6A-1 by the insurer does not
give the insured a right to sue the insurer.48 Rather, the express remedy, under the statute, is an administrative hearing.49 The Paxton court

did hold, however, that a private cause of action may exist where the
insurance
company is guilty of "malicious intent to injure or de50
fraud.

46. W. VA. CODE § 33-6A-1 (Supp. 1994). The statute provides, in pertinent part, that
an insurance company may cancel a policy only where one or more of the following reasons
exists:
(a)
The named insured fails to discharge when due any of his obligations in
connection with the payment of premium for such policy .. .
(b)
The policy was obtained through material misrepresentation;
(c)
The insured violates any of the material terms and conditions of the policy;
(d)
The named insured or other operator . . . :
(1) Has his operator's license suspended or revoked [for DUI or drug
charges while driving];
(2) Is or becomes subject to epilepsy or heart attacks . . .
(e)
The named insured or an other operator . . . is convicted or forfeits bail
for any of the following:
(l) Any felony or assault involving the use of a motor vehicle;
(2) Negligent homicide arising out of the use of a motor vehicle;
(3) Operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or of any controlled substance... ;
(4) Leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident in which the insured is
involved without reporting it as required by law;
(5) Theft of a motor vehicle . . . ;
(6) Making false statements in the application for a motor vehicle license;
(7) A third violation, within twelve months, of any moving traffic violation which constitutes a misdemeanor. ...
Id.
47. Id. Any notice of cancellation for reasons other than those elaborated in W. VA.
CODE § 33-6A-1 are void. W. VA. CODE § 33-6A-2 (1992).
48. Paxton, 663 F. Supp. at 101.
49. See W. VA. CODE § 33-6A-5 (1992) (establishing an administrative remedy, but
providing for no alternative remedy for violation of statutory cancellation requirements).
50. Paxton, 663 F. Supp. at 101. For the standard of malicious conduct needed for a
tort claim, see Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 352 S.E.2d 73, 80 (W.
Va. 1986).
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The elements of cancellation notification were expressly detailed in
Conn v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Co.5 A notice of cancellation
"must be clear, definite and certain," 2 and must contain such a clear
expression of intent that it would be apparent to an ordinary person
that the insurance company intended to cancel.53 Additionally, the insurance company must provide the insured with the exact reason(s) for
policy cancellation.54 Finally, the reason(s) for cancellation must conform to a reason delineated in West Virginia Code § 33-6A-l. s5
The leading case on non-renewal of liability policies is Horace
Mann Insurance Co. v. Shaw,56 which holds that, where an insurance
policy is in effect for more than two years, the insured is entitled to
the renewal protection of West Virginia Code § 33-6A-4. 7 In addition
to this statutory non-renewal protection, the insurer must provide the
insured with at least forty-five days advance notice of non-renewal
intent, as well as the specific reason(s) for the non-renewal.58
An insured's non-renewal protection extends to all additional policies issued by the insurer for additional or replacement automobiles.
These additional policies need not have been in existence for two or

51. 439 S.E.2d 418 (W. Va. 1993). For a more in depth analysis of cancellation requirements, see W. VA. INS. REGS. §§ 114-3-1 to -3 (1994); Termination of Automobile
Liability Insurance, Informational Letter No. 1 (Apr. 1967); Procedure for Filing Policy
Forms Relating to Cancellation, Informational Letter 1-A (June 1967); Cancellation or Nonrenewal of Automobile Liability or Physical Damage Insurance Policies, Informational Letter
No. 35 (Mar. 1, 1986); Usage of Vehicle Registration Lists as a Basis for Cancellation or
Non-renewal of Policies, Informational Letter No. 47 (Dec. 28, 1987).
52. Staley v. Municipal Mut. Ins. Co. of West Virginia, 282 S.E.2d 56 (W. Va. 1981)
(providing the standard for sufficiency of notice).
53. Any ambiguities in the notice will be resolved in favor of the insured. Id.
54. W. VA. CODE § 33-6A-3 (1992) (stating that the notice of cancellation must contain the reason or reasons relied upon by such insurer for such cancellation).
55. See supra note 46.
56. 337 S.E.2d 908 (W. Va. 1985).
57. W. VA. CODE § 33-6A-4 (1992). This statute expressly states that an insurer may
not fail to renew an outstanding automobile insurance policy or physical damage insurance
policy which has been in existence for more than two years except for those reasons enumerated in the statute. These reasons are similar to those detailed in W. VA. CODE § 336A-1 (Supp. 1994). See supra note 46.
58. W. VA. CODE § 33-6A-4 (1992).
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more years.59 As in the case of policy cancellations, non-renewal of
automobile liability insurance policies, for reasons other than those
enumerated in the statute, does not give rise to a private cause of action for the aggrieved policy-holder. The policy-holder must grieve
through the administrative process.6" A private cause of action for
non-renewal will only arise where the aggrieved insured can prove a
tort claim of "malicious intent to injure or defraud" on the part of the
insurance company.6'
C. Inclusion and Exclusion
Inclusions and exclusions allow the expansion or limitation of
policy coverage through specific contractual provisions. An insured
may always negotiate for more insurance coverage through an inclusion
clause; there are no statutory prohibitions to providing coverage above
the statutory minimum requirements. Thus, inclusion clauses which add
a higher level of coverage are always permitted in West Virginia.
Exclusion clauses, however, present several problems. An exclusion
is simply a clause limiting some aspect of insurance coverage. Because
the primary objective of liability coverage is the indemnification of
injured third-parties, an exclusionary clause must not abrogate the
tortfeasor's duty to indemnify. To that end, exclusionary language in a
policy will be strictly construed against the insurer to promote this
policy of indemnification.62
There are several different types of exclusions which have been
held valid in this state. First, the "named driver exclusion" allows a
policy-holder to specifically name a driver who is to be excluded from
coverage under the insurance policy;63 to be effective, the exclusion
must refer to the designated individual(s) specifically by name.64 An
59. Mann, 337 S.E.2d at 912.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Marshall v. Fair, 416 S.E.2d 67 (W. Va. 1992).
63. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(a) (1992).
64. See Burr v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 359 S.E.2d 626 (W. Va. 1987) (requiring
that an excluded individual be specifically named). In Jones v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 356
S.E.2d 634, 635 (W. Va. 1987), the court provided an example of a "named driver" exclu-
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exclusionary clause may not designate a class of excluded individuals;
such a clause has been held void by the court. 5 Additionally, the
named driver exclusion is of no force or effect up to the limits of
financial responsibility required by West Virginia Code § 17D-4-2. 6
Currently, under the "family purpose doctrine," where an automobile is driven by a named excluded family member on the insured's
policy, the insurer must provide the mandatory minimum coverage for
damages incurred by the family member's negligence. The "family
purpose doctrine" was explained by the court in Freeland v. Freeland
as follows:
Where one purchases and maintains an automobile for the comfort,
convenience, pleasure, entertainment and recreation of his family, any
member thereof operating the automobile will be regarded as an agent or
servant of the owner, and such owner will be held liable in damages for
injuries sustained by a third person by reason of the negligent operation of
the vehicle by such agent or servant. The family member is carrying out
the purpose for which the automobile was provided."7

The family purpose doctrine protects third-party victims by insuring
that the owner of the automobile incurs liability for the actions of a
family member - thus, protecting the third-party from the negligence
of a financially irresponsible driver. 8
sion clause:
It is agreed that such insurance as is afforded by the policy shall not apply with
respect to any automobile or its use while such automobile is being operated by
the following designated individual:
DALE EDWARD JONES
The named assured accepts this endorsement as witness his signature.
X/s/Evelyn R. Jones.
Id. Note that the clause highlights the name of the excluded individual and that the signature of the insured party is required following the exclusion clause.
65. Burr, 359 S.E.2d at 626. In Burr, the court held that an exclusionary clause must
designate a specific individual by name, and that an exclusionary clause designed to exclude
coverage for "persons operating insured vehicles with dealer plates" as a class was void. Id.
at 632.
66. Jones, 356 S.E.2d at 634.
67. 162 S.E.2d 922, 925 (W. Va. 1968), overruled on other grounds, Lee v. Comer,
224 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976).
68. Id. For further explanation of the family purpose doctrine, see, e.g., Bartz v.
Wheat, 285 S.E.2d 894 (W. Va. 1982); Bell v. West, 284 S.E.2d 885 (W. Va. 1981).
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Initially, the southern district court, in McKenzie v. Federal Mutual
Insurance Co.,69 held that an express exclusion of a policy-holder's
son was valid in accordance with West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(a)
where there was an express contractual agreement, notwithstanding the
family purpose doctrine. The'McKenzie court held that an insured may
only exclude a family member from the insurance policy by a restrictive endorsement which conforms to the statutory requirements of West
Virginia Code § 33-6-31(a)." However, the McKenzie court failed to
consider the exclusion statute in conjunction with the mandatory minimum coverage requirements of § 17D-4-2.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia considered this
issue in Jones v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Co.7 The Jones court
restricted McKenzie by reading the exclusionary code provisions in
conjunction with the statutory minimum coverage requirements. In
Jones, the insured expressly excluded her teenage son from her insurance policy, to eliminate her "high risk" teenage son from her policy
and avoid the resulting increase in insurance premiums.72 The Jones
court held that an insured cannot so exclude a family member, or any
driver, from coverage up to the mandatory minimum limits of West
Virginia Code § 17D-4-2, notwithstanding the common law family
purpose doctrine.73 The court interpreted the legislative intent of
Chapter 17 of the West Virginia Code as providing security for thirdparties "who might suffer bodily injury or property damage from negligent drivers."' Above the mandatory minimum coverage requirements,
West Virginia.Code § 33-6-31(a) allows the insurer and the insured to
agree to a "named driver exclusion."'7 5 However, the insured is free to

69. 393 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. W. Va. 1975). Exclusionary clauses are governed by W.
VA. CODE § 33-6-31(a) (1992), which exempts "any persons specifically excluded by restrictive endorsement"
70. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(a) (1992). This section sets forth the requirements for an
exclusion from the insured's liability policy. The family purpose doctrine is a common law
remedy and, as such, is trumped by an express statutory mandate. McKenzie, 393 F. Supp.
at 29.
71. Jones, 356 S.E.2d at 634.
72. Id. at 635.
73. Id. at 636.
74. Id. at 637.
75. Id. The minimum financial responsibility limitations are enumerated in W. VA.
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contract away coverage rights for her own property, such as coverage
for any damage to the insured's personal automobile.76 In summary,
an insured is free to contract away her own personal liability coverage
through a named driver exclusion, but may not contract for third-party
liability coverage below the statutory minimums."
In Ward v. Baker," the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia outlined the state's policy specifics for the "named driver exclusion" in automobile insurance policies. The Ward court held that a
named driver exclusion is valid only where the excluded individual is
specifically designated by name.79 Where a valid named driver exclusion is present, and where the injured third-party seeks recovery under
the family purpose doctrine, the insurance company need only provide
coverage up to the mandatory minimum coverage limits. The family
purpose doctrine does not prevail over a clear and unambiguous named
driver exclusion."0
Where the named insured receives a notice of insurance cancellation which is due to the legal violations of a covered party, the insured
may exclude that party from his insurance coverage." Such an exclusion is allowed in order for the named insured to maintain insurance
coverage, and to avoid punishing the named insured for the wrongdoing of others. This exclusion was expressly written into West Virginia
Code § 33-6-31(a), and is a provision of which attorneys should be
aware.

CODE § 17D-4-2 (1991), which provides that the insurer must cover at least $20,000 for the
insured's vehicle and at least $40,000 for the bodily injury or death of the persons injured
in an accident, as well as at least $10,000 for the destruction of property involved in the

accident which is not owned by the insured.
76. Jones, 356 S.E.2d at 636. Further, West Virginia Code § 17D-4-12(b)(2) is entirely silent on the issue of protection for the named insured's property, providing only for the
"destruction of property of others." W. VA. CODE § 17D-4-12(b)(2) (Supp. 1994).

77. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(a) (1992).
78.
exclusion
79.
80.
81.

425 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 1992). Ward is similar to Jones in that the named driver
was held to be valid in Ward only above the minimum coverage requirements.
Id. at 247; W. VA. CODE § 17D-4-2 (1991).
Ward, 425 S.E.2d at 250.
W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(a) (1992).
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D. Omnibus Clauses and Permittees
Generally, an automobile insurance policy covers the "insured," or
that person who secures the insurance policy and is a licensed driver
of competent legal capacity. The purpose of an omnibus clause is "to
extend coverage, in proper circumstances, to any person using the
insured vehicle, and to afford greater protection to the public generally."58 2 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has construed
an omnibus clause to be "remedial in nature," 3 holding that such a
clause "must be construed liberally so as to provide insurance coverage
where possible." 4
Omnibus clauses are governed by two different West Virginia
Code provisions. West Virginia Code § 17D-4-12(b)(2) extends liability
coverage to the insured and "any other person, as insured, using any
such vehicle . . . with the express or implied permission of such
named insured." 5 West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(a) extends liability
coverage to any other person with "the consent, express or implied, of
the named insured or his spouse against liability for death or bodily
injury.""6 The former statute focuses on the insured's permission,
while the latter statute focuses on the insured's consent. There is no
practical difference between the two governing statutes.
Issues of coverage under an omnibus clause are resolved primarily
through one of three judicial rules.8 7 The "strict construction" or "con82.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 175 S.E.2d 478 (W. Va.

1970).
83.

Burr v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 359 S.E.2d 626 (W. Va. 1987).

84. Id.
85. W. VA. CODE § 17D-4-12(b)(2) (Supp. 1994).
86. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(a) (1991).
87. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 408 S.E.2d 358, 361 (W. Va. 1991).
Omnibus clause coverage in West Virginia, developed in a four-part evolution. Initially,
courts extended omnibus coverage only when the bailee obtained express permission from
the insured - this was known as the "strict construction" rule. From strict construction,
courts moved to a "liberal" approach, also known as the "initial permission" rule, which
provided that the bailee need only have secured permission initially from the insured in
order to be covered by the insured's policy. Next, the courts held that the "minor deviation"
rule applied when omnibus coverage hinged on whether the bailee was using the vehicle
according to the terms of the bailment. Finally, the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed its
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version" rule requires use of the automobile precisely within the scope
of permission granted." Under the "minor deviation" rule, omnibus
protection is extended to the bailee if the use made by the bailee is
not a gross violation of the terms of the bailment.8 9 Under the "liberal" or "initial permission" rule, the bailee only need have secured initial permission to use the vehicle; such permission entitles the bailee to
use the vehicle while he or she retains possession, leaving the bailor or
the insurer liable for any actions taken during this time.90 The court
has held that West Virginia is an "initial permission" state in accordance with the purpose of "liberalizing coverage."'" Thus, if an insured permits another driver to operate his insured vehicle, the
insured's policy covers the results of the permittee's negligence.
In Burr v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,92 the court considered the issue of an omnibus exclusion. The Burr insurance contract
contained a restrictive endorsement clause within the insurance contract,
with which the insured and the insurance company intended to exclude
omnibus coverage for a class of persons.93 The insured was a garage
owner who attempted to narrow his omnibus coverage by inserting this
exclusion clause in order to lower his rates. The clause stated that any
automobile which was being used with dealer plates would not be
covered unless it was being used in a business capacity.94 The Burr
court held that omnibus coverage is mandatory under West Virginia
Code § 33-6-31(a), wherein the legislature has "demonstrated a clear
intent to afford coverage to anyone using a vehicle."95 Thus, an exclusion clause which designates a class of persons to be excluded is not a
valid omnibus exclusion. The Burr court held that, in order to be an

stance and adopted the "initial permission" rule, which currently is in effect in West Virginia.
88. Id.
89. APPLEMAN, supra note 20, § 4368.
90. Taylor, 408 S.E.2d at 361.
91. Id. at 364.
92. 359 S.E.2d 626 (W. Va. 1987).
93. Id.
94. Id.at 631.
95. Id.at 632.
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effective omnibus exclusion,
the insured must designate by name those
96
excluded.
be
to
individuals
An interesting quandary can arise where the permittee gives another person permission to drive the insured's automobile. In Adkins v.
Inland Mutual Insurance Co., ' the bailee, James Canterbury, who had
previously obtained permission to drive the insured vehicle, became
intoxicated and a friend, Thomas Coffinan, volunteered to drive him
home in the insured's car. The court held that, although the purpose of
omnibus clauses is to protect the general public from negligent drivers
who are uninsured, the insurance policy did not cover Thomas
Coffman because he had not received permission to drive from the
named insured.9"
E. Limits of the Policy and Guests
In Federal Kemper Insurance Co. v. Karlet,99 the court addressed
per person liability limitations. In Karlet, the victim's children had
filed a claim of loss of parental consortium and the court held that a
claim for loss of consortium arising from an automobile accident,
where the claimant is not the person suffering bodily injury, is restricted by the per person limit of liability in the policy.' Specifically, the claim for the injured person and any related claim for loss of
consortium are covered within the same per person limit of liability;
the recovery for both claims cannot exceed the per person limit.'
By statute, all automobile liability insurance policies must provide
coverage for guests and invitees.' ° West Virginia Code § 33-6-29

96. Id. at 633.
97. 20 S.E.2d 471, 472 (W. Va. 1942).
98. Id. at 473.
99. 428 S.E.2d 60 (W. Va. 1993).
100. Id. at 62.
101. Id. See also Davis v. Foley, 1995 WL 222036 (W. Va. 1995) (holding that the
per person limitation applied to a recovery for the beneficiaries of an estate in a wrongful
death action).
102. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-29 (Supp. 1994). See Johnson v. Continental Casualty Co.,
201 S.E.2d 292 (W. Va. 1973) (holding that an insurer is precluded from issuing an insurance policy which lacks coverage for guests).
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provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o insurer shall issue any policy
which excludes coverage to the owner or operator of a motor vehicle
on account of bodily injury ...to any guest.., who is a passenger
in such vehicle."10 3 Any policy which purports to exclude coverage of
guests or invitees is issued contrary to the statute and is void.'
F. Insolvency, Immunity, and Non-Derivative Liability
The primary purpose of automobile insurance is to provide indemnification for injured third parties. In the past, tortfeasors and insurance
companies used several defenses to avoid indemnification. Insolvency
of the tortfeasor, immunity of the tortfeasor, and derivative liability
have all been asserted in attempts to avoid financial responsibility.
These defenses are no longer applicable in West Virginia.
Insolvency of the tortfeasor presents an interesting question for the
injured third party. 5 If the insured is insolvent, can the third party
recover from the insurer? The court answered this question in Anderson
v. Robinson,"6 holding that the injured plaintiff may sue the
tortfeasor's insurance company to satisfy a judgment against the insolvent insured. Specifically, the court held that when the plaintiff had
obtained a judgment against a tortfeasor who then filed a petition for
bankruptcy in federal court, the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C.
§ 362 did not preclude the plaintiff from proceeding against the
insolvent's insurer in an attempt to collect.'0 7 The Anderson court

103. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-29 (Supp. 1994).
104. Johnson, 201 S.E.2d at 297.
105. Insolvency issues are controlled by two statutory provisions. See W. VA. CODE §§
17D-4-6, -12(f)(2) (1991 & Supp. 1994). Both provisions hold the insurance company liable
to an injured third party, regardless of the insured's solvency.
106. 411 S.E.2d 35 (W. Va. 1991).
107. Id. Basically, this decision prevents insurance companies from dodging payment on
the policy due to the insured's bankruptcy; this rationale follows the purpose of liability
insurance, which is the protection of accident victims. See also Credit Alliance Corp. v.
Williams, 851 F.2d 119 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that 11 U.S.C. § 362 does not protect a
guarantor from a creditor's action to enforce a default judgment); Broy v. Inland Mut. Ins.
Co., 233 S.E.2d 131 (V. Va. 1977) (holding that if an insured with liability coverage does
not pay for damages due to his negligence, the injured party may proceed against the insur-

ance company of the tortfeasor).
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held that where liability clearly has been established, and following a
judgment against the tortfeasor, the injured plaintiff may sue the
tortfeasor's insurer to recover his damages." 8
Immunity also presents a quandary for the injured third party, as it
has been used, in the past, as a defense for insurance companies who
wished to avoid coverage payments. Generally, immunity is broken into
four categories: charitable immunity; family immunity; worker's compensation inmunity; and governmental immunity. West Virginia does
not recognize charitable immunity as a defense to negligence. In
Adkins v. Saint Francis Hospital,0 9 the court held that charitable immunity was no longer a defense to an action in tort.
Family immunity is separated into various relational categories.
Husband versus wife immunity was abolished as a defense in West
Virginia, in Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer."' In Lee v. Comer,"' child
versus parent immunity was abolished. Further, in Erie Indemnity Co.
v. Kerns,"' parental versus child immunity was abolished. Therefore,
when a child is involved in an accident and is injured, and the parent
is at fault, the child can sue his or her negligent parent and ultimately
collect from the parent's insurance company. Likewise, a parent who is
injured can sue his or her negligent child. Similarly, when a wife is
injured in an accident where the husband is at fault, the wife may sue
her husband, and ultimately collect from the responsible insured's insurance company.
Worker's compensation provides an equivalent to immunity for the
insured and "the insurance company. Worker's compensation provides
compensation for parties injured while on the job;". therefore, if the

108. Anderson, 411 S.E.2d at 40.
109. 143 S.E.2d 154 (W. Va. 1965). The plaintiff brought an action in tort against a
nonprofit hospital for injuries sustained as a result of the negligence of a hospital employee.
The court held that there is no charitable immunity in West Virginia. Id. at 158.
110. 244 S.E.2d 338 (W. Va. 1978) (holding that husband versus wife immunity was
abolished).
111. 224 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976) (holding the child versus parental immunity was
abolished).
112. 367 S.E.2d 774 (W. Va. 1988) (holding that parental versus child immunity was
abolished).
113. See W. VA. CODE § 23-2-6(a), (e) (1994).
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injured party is entitled to worker's compensation benefits for an accident, that party is precluded from recovery under any other accident
liability policy. 14
Under the state constitution, the State of West Virginia is granted
immunity." 5 In Pittsburgh Elevator Co. v. West Virginia Board of
Regents,"6 the court qualified the state's immunity, by holding that
the state is liable when it has purchased liability insurance, but only up
to the limits of its insurance policy. Therefore, the state is immune
over the limits of the policy. This is the "under and up to" principle
for state liability." 7 Political subdivisions are covered by the Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act of 1986, which provides
immunity to political subdivisions and regulates the cost of insurance."' While immunity is provided for some activities, political subdivisions are still liable for negligent vehicle operation and for general
negligence." 9
Under the principles of non-derivative liability, an insurance company does not derive its liability directly from the insured. Rather, the
insurance company has a duty to pay on an insurance policy which is
issued prior to an "insured event."'2 ° In order for the insurance company to be liable on a policy, the insured must purchase that policy
before an accident occurs.' In addition to express limitations within
the policy itself, an insured may render a policy void if that policy is
obtained fraudulently after the occurrence of an "insured event."'2
Thus, a fraudulently obtained policy, obtained after an accident, pro-

114. Id. See Smith v. Monsanto Co., 822 F. Supp. 327 (S.D. W. Va. 1992) (holding
that the legislative immunity afforded employers under the Worker's Compensation Act is
designed to remove accidents from the common law tort system).
115. W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 35.
116. 310 S.E.2d 675 (W. Va. 1983).
117. Id.
118. W. VA. CODE §§ 29-12A-1 to -18 (1992). The Act became effective on June 1,
1986 and provides immunity for seventeen different types of governmental actions. W. VA.
CODE § 29-12A-5 (1992).
119. W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-5 (1992).
120. Brown v. Community Moving & Storage, Inc., 414 S.E.2d 452 (W. Va. 1992).
121. Id.
122. Id. (holding that an automobile insurance policy obtained fraudulently after the
occurrence of an "insured event' was void ab initio).
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vides no coverage to the offending insured, leaving no coverage for the
loss suffered by an injured third party, but a valid policy creates a
duty of payment on the part of the insurer.
G. Operation, Maintenance, and Use
Automobile liability coverage is extended to the "operation, maintenance and use" of the insured vehicle. The phrase "arising out of
operation, maintenance or use" in automobile liability insurance policies
has been given a broad interpretation by the courts.' West Virginia
Code § 33-6-31(a) provides that insurance policies issued in this state
must provide coverage for the loss or damage occasioned by the "negligence in the operation or use" of the vehicle. 4 In Baber v. Fortner
by Poe,' the court, in a wrongful death action where the tortfeasor
had shot the decedent from the cab of his pickup truck, concluded that
the death was not a result of the "operation, maintenance or use" of
the vehicle, and thus the tortfeasor's automobile insurance did not
cover the inijury. In Johnson v. State Farm Automobile Insurance
Co.,2 6 the court considered the definition of "operation, maintenance,
and use," and recognized that "use" was a much broader term than
"operation." The Johnson court recognized that "use" of a vehicle can
include: the loading and unloading of a vehicle; actions taken by a bus
driver to maintain order; explosion of a beer bottle due to the heat
inside a vehicle; accidental asphyxiation of a minor child resulting
from the mother's use of a vehicle to commit suicide; and an attack by
a dog on a passenger. 7
123. Baber v. Forter by Poe, 412 S.E.2d 814, 817 (W. Va. 1991); Dotts v. Taressa
J.A., 390 S.E.2d 568, 574 (W. Va. 1990) (holding that "operation, maintenance, or use"
should be given a wide interpretation, making it sufficient if the coverage event falls within
any one of these terms).
124. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(a) (1992).
125. Baber, 412 S.E.2d at 816.
126. 438 S.E.2d 869 (W. Va. 1993).
127. Id. (citing Farmers Ins. Co. v. Till, 825 P.2d 954 (Ariz. 1991) (holding that an
attack by a dog on a passenger constituted "use"); Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Batchelder,
421 So.2d 59 (Fin. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that the explosion of a beer bottle due to
the hot interior of a vehicle parked in the sun constituted "use"); Ohio Casualty Ins. Group
v. Robinson, 338 N.W.2d 898 (Mich. 1983) (holding that "use" includes the injuries resulting from a slip and fall accident which occurred during the loading and unloading of a
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H. Intentional Exclusion Clauses
Automobile insurance typically excludes coverage for intentional
129
In State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co. v. Skeens,
conduct.'
the insurance policy contained an exclusion for intentional conduct
where the insured "intentionally causes bodily injury or damage," and
the court has held that this exclusionary clause was valid. However,
subsequent to Skeens, the court has held that an exclusion clause for an
intentional tort is not valid up to the amount of statutorily mandated
liability insurance; thus, the exclusion would only apply to amounts
which exceed the statutory minimum. 3 West Virginia's insurance
laws provide recourse for those injured by the negligence of other drivers; the court upheld this policy by providing for coverage up to the
minimum mandatory requirements to protect the interests of third-party
injured persons as required by West Virginia Code § 17D-2A-1.'

vehicle); Classified Ins. Corp. v. Vodinelich, 354 N.W.2d 63 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (holding
that the accidental asphyxiation of a minor child resulting from the mother's use of a vehicle exhaust to commit suicide constituted "use"); Suburban Serv. Bus Co. v. National Mut.
Casualty Co., 183 S.W.2d 376 (Mo. 1944) (holding that an action taken by a bus driver to
maintain order constituted "use")).
128. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Skeens, 661 F. Supp. 1109 (S.D. W. Va. 1987).
129. Id. at I I 11. Skeens must be one of the more colorful cases in West Virginia common law. Harry Skeens, the insured, intended to drive to a friend's wedding on the day of
the accident. He and his wife were estranged and in the process of getting a divorce. While
traveling to the wedding, Mr. Skeens became agitated about the general failure of his own
marriage and decided to return home. Upon doing so, Mr. Skeens saw his ex-wife with her
new companion, and promptly began a fight. Ms. Maynard, Mr. Skeens ex-wife, escaped the
fight and began walking home down the road. Mr. Skeens followed her in his truck, and
ran into Ms. Maynard at about 15-20 miles per hour, eventually, Mr. Skeens hit Ms.
Maynard again with his truck. During this incident, Mr. Skeens also pulled a shotgun from
his gun rack and began to beat Ms. Maynard with it, as the gun was malfunctioning and
would not fire. Mr. Skeens admitted that his acts were intentional. Ms. Maynard attempted
to recover some of her costs under her own automobile insurance policy, claiming that Mr.
Skeens was an uninsured motorist.
130. Dots, 390 S.E.2d at 570.
131. Id.; W. VA. CODE § 17D-2A-1 (1991).
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Other Insurance Clauses

Due to the pervasive nature of insurance coverage, insureds often
need or have overlapping policies to obtain the necessary insurance
coverage. Accordingly, most insurance policies contain "other insurance" clauses to deal with priority problems between the various insurance policies obtained. There are three main types of other insurance
clauses: pro-rata; escape; and excess. A "pro-rata" clause provides for
an apportionment of payment obligations among insurance companies
and is the most common "other insurance" clause. An "escape" clause
provides that an insurance company is not liable for payment where
another insurance company covers the same accident. An "excess"
clause provides that the insurance company is only liable for any excess amount above the policy limits of any other insurance coverage;
the other policy is primary, while the subject policy is secondary.
"Other insurance" clauses present problems for the courts because, in
certain instances, these clauses can clash.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia adopted a bright
line rule that when a pro-rata clause and an excess clause appear in the
automobile liability policies of both the driver and the owner of the
automobile, the insurance policy of the car owner is the primary policy
and must bear the whole loss, within the limits of the policy."' In
other words, the owner's policy follows the car. When several policies
insure the same risk, "the policy insuring the liability of the owner of
3
a described vehicle has the first and primary obligation.""
A pro-rata clause is one within the policy which apportions a loss
when there are other, valid and collectible insurance policies. 34 How-

132. Allstate Ins. Agency v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 364 S.E.2d 30 (W. Va. 1987)
(holding that the owner's insurance is primary and follows the car). See also State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383 S.E.2d 791 (W. Va. 1989)
(holding that the owner's liability policy is primary despite pro-rata and excess clauses).
133. American Sur. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1958).
134. Allstate Ins. Agency, 364 S.E.2d at 32. See also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 209 F. Supp. 83 (N.D. W. Va. 1962) (holding that excess clauses are repugnant, and that pro-rata liability applies); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
U.S.F. & G. Co., 490 F.2d 407 (4th Cir. 1974) (holding escape and excess clauses repug-
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ever, merely inserting a pro-rata clause within an insurance policy does
not relieve the primary insurer of its duty to defend the injured insured; on the contrary, the primary obligation to defend and indemnify
the insured follows the automobile, rather than the driver, to facilitate
an orderly determination of priorities among carriers which insure the
same risk.135 The courts do not consider a pro-rata clause within the
and accordingly treat the pro-rata
driver's policy as other insurance,
36
non-operative.
as
provision
J. Stacking
"Stacking" of automobile liability coverages refers to the piling up
of multiple coverages from multiple policies, or the piling up of
coverages of multiple vehicles in a single policy, when there is only
one loss.' Stacking of automobile liability policies in West Virginia
is not permitted where there is express anti-stacking language in the
policy's limitation of liability clause.' According to Shamblin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 39 where the anti-stacking provision is
plain and unambiguous, it will be applied. The court held that there is
no statutory provision violated where an anti-stacking provision appears
regardless of the number of autoin the limitation of liability clause,
40
mobiles involved in the accident.1
nant, and that pro-rata liability applies).
135. Allstate Ins. Agency, 364 S.E.2d at 33.
136. Id.
137. When stacking is allowed, recovery is permitted up to the limits of each insurance
policy. When more policies can be reached for coverage, a victim is more likely to receive
full compensation for all of his injuries. Stacking may also be referred to as "pyramiding,"
"aggregating," or "pooling." "Intrapolicy stacking" involves one policy which provides coverage for multiple vehicles. "Interpolicy stacking" involves multiple policies, and may involve
multiple vehicles. "Horizontal stacking" refers to the named insured seeking to stack his own
policies. "Vertical stacking" refers to the named insured seeking to stack his own policy

onto someone else's policy. R

JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW

678 (1987).

138. Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 332 S.E.2d 639 (W. Va. 1985).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 646. In Shamblin, one automobile liability policy covered three commercial
trucks. Shamblin wanted to stack the liability coverage of those three trucks, covered under
the same policy, to pay for the judgment The court held that liability anti-stacking language
was valid. See also Tynes v. Supreme Life Ins. Co. of Am., 209 S.E.2d 567, 569 (W. Va.
1974) ("Where provisions in an insurance policy are plain and unambiguous and where such
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Choice of Law

Generally, the law of the state in which the policy is issued governs, and its law applies to the policy. However, like most legal generalities, there are exceptions. One notable exception occurred in Charles
v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.,"4 ' where the court held that an
insurance policy issued in Kentucky for a Kentucky resident was governed by West Virginia law with regard to the minimum policy limits.
The accident occurred in West Virginia, but the insured was a Kentucky resident and the liability policy was formed in Kentucky. The
Charles court ignored the contract interpretation rule in order to gain
recovery for the injured insured; under Kentucky law, recovery would
not have been permitted under the plain language of the contract, but
West Virginia law allowed recovery up to the minimum statutory limits.14 Thus, Charles does not present a rule, but an exception made
in order to sustain a favorable outcome.
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
recently held that forum non conveniens may be applied by a circuit
court to automobile insurance cases.'43 Forum non conveniens is a
common law doctrine which allows a court, in its sound discretion, to
decline to exercise jurisdiction to promote the convenience of witnesses
and the ends of justice."' This is true even where jurisdiction and
venue are authorized by statute. 4 The court held that, where the
case involves the interpretation of an insurance contract formed in one
state to be performed in another, the law of the state of formation
shall govern, unless another state has a more significant relationship to

provisions are not contrary to a statute, regulation or public policy, the provisions will be

applied and not construed.").
141. 452 S.E.2d 384 (W. Va. 1994).
142. Id. at 390.
143. Cannelton v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 1994 WL 692945 (W. Va. 1994). See
also Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Tsapis, 400 S.E.2d 239 (1990) (adopting the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens for courts of record in West Virginia).
144. Cannelton, 1994 WL at 692945.

145. Id. In Cannelton, the court also held that the circuit court's decision to invoke the
doctrine of forum non conveniens will not be reversed unless it is found that the circuit
court abused its discretion.
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the transaction and the parties, or unless the law of the contract state is
contrary to the public policy of the performance state. 46
L. Punitive Damages
In Hensley v. Erie Insurance Co., the court held that a West
Virginia automobile liability insurance policy will cover punitive damages for gross, reckless, or wanton negligence. However, the standard
in Hensley is an enigma. The West Virginia standard for an award of
punitive damages according to Wells v. Smith14 is stated as follows:
"In actions of tort, where gross fraud, malice, oppression, or wanton,
willful, or reckless conduct or criminal indifference to civil obligations
affecting the rights of others appear, or where legislative enactment
authorizes it." Thus, punitive damages in tort can be recovered only for
very bad Wells misconduct, but an automobile liability insurance policy
covers punitive damages for very mild Hensley misconduct. To give
Hensley any meaning one must state that there is a very narrow
Hensley window of misconduct where punitive damages are both recoverable and covered by an automobile insurance policy. Misconduct
below the Hensley standard results in no recovery for punitive .damages. Misconduct above the Hensley standard results in no liability coverage, but recovery for punitive damages is allowed.
M

Notice Requirements

An insured must provide notice to his insurance company to allow
the insurance company the opportunity to investigate the claim fully
and to formulate an estimate of its liabilities. 49' The insured must notify his insurance company of any payable occurrence within a reasonable time period after the accident; such notification is a condition

146. Id. See also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Triangle Indus., Inc., 390 S.E.2d 562 (W.
Va. 1990) (holding that a valid public interest concern for forum non conveniens is the
"advantages of conducting a trial in a forum familiar with the applicable law and avoiding

conflicts of law").
147. 283 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1981).
148. 297 S.E.2d 872, 877 (W. Va. 1982).
149. Petrice v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 260 S.E.2d 276 (W. Va. 1979).
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precedent to recovery. 5 However, the courts will allow liberal interpretations of the notice requirement in order to sustain the insured's
right to coverage under a policy and avoid forfeiture. The need for a
proof of loss may be obviated by the actions of the insurance company
- for example, where the insurance company's conduct indicates that
an agent of the company obtained appraisals of damages, where the
company attempted arbitration on the amount of damages, and where
the company wrote out a settlement check.'
The insured is under a duty to cooperate with the insurance company in its investigation of the accident.'52 However, the court has
held that in order for a policy to be voided for lack of the insured's
cooperation, the insurance company must prove that the failure to cooperate was substantial and of such a nature as to prejudice the
insurer's rights.' Additionally, the insurer must exercise "reasonable
diligence" in obtaining the cooperation of the insured prior to voiding
the policy, including attendance at trial.'54 The burden of proof for
cancellation of the policy for the insured's non-cooperation rests on the
insurer; the insurer must show that the insured willfully and intentionally violated the cooperation clause of the insurance policy before
denying coverage.'55
In Bowyer v. Thomas,'56 the court explored the scope of the
insured's duty to cooperate and the responsibilities of the insurance
company toward a non-cooperative insured. Applying the principle of
"extend[ing] 'the maximum protection possible consonant with fairness
to the insurer,"' the Bowyer court held that the insurance company
must prove that the insured intentionally failed to cooperate. ' In
Bowyer, the insured had intermittent contact with the Aetna attorneys;
while his cooperation was not exemplary, the court found that the

150.
151.
152.
153.

154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 278.
Id.
Bowyer v. Thomas, 423 S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1992).
Id. at 911.
Id. See also APPLEMAN, supra note 20, §§4471-4476.
Bowyer, 423 S.E.2d at 906.
Id. at 910.
Id. at 911.
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insured made some effort to cooperate with Aetna.158 Additionally, an
insurer has the burden of proving that it exercised due diligence in
maintaining contact with the insured, a burden which Aetna failed to
carry.'59 Finally, the insurer must prove that it was substantially prejudiced by the insured's failure to cooperate. The Bowyer court defined
this prejudice as an insured's failure to apprise his insurer of a potential lawsuit, with such failure rendering the insurance company incapable of mounting a proper defense. 60 In Bowyer, a judgment had not
yet been rendered against the insured, and the insurer had been apprised of the pending case from its inception. The court found that the
insurance company was not substantially prejudiced in this case.'
IV. MEDICAL PAYMENTS COVERAGE

Medical payments (MEDPAY) coverage is not legislatively mandated in West Virginia." An insurance company may write the terms
of its MEDPAY coverage as it wishes.'63 Because there is no legislative control of medical payments provisions, the issues which arise in
MEDPAY coverage generally center around the interpretation of specific language in the insurance policy.
A. Stacking Provisions
MEDPAY coverage in automobile insurance policies may be
"stacked" so that the insured recovers under the medical payments
provisions of each automobile policy.'64 This means that insureds who

158. Id.

159. Id.
160. Bowyer, 423 S.E.2d at 914.
161. Id.
162. Carney v. Erie Ins. Co., 434 S.E.2d 374, 377 (W. Va. 1993).
163. Id. Some states have statutory controls over MEDPAY coverage; in such states,
the statutory language is generally controlling. See, e.g., Karabin v. State Auto. Mut. Ins.
Co., 462 N.E.2d 403 (Ohio 1984) (holding that the statutory mandates must be followed in
MEDPAY stacking). For background on non-existent statutory guidelines for MEDPAY coverage, see generally APPLEMAN, supra note 20, § 4902, at 231.
164. Moomaw v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 379 F. Supp. 697, 702 (S.D. W. Va.

1974).
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are covered simultaneously by more than one policy can recover on
each policy up to the limits of liability or up to the amount of judgment against the tort-feasor, whichever is less.'65 In Moomaw v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,' 66 the southern district court
followed the reasoning of Bell v. State Farm Mutual Insurance
Co.,1"7 which held that a plaintiff may recover individually under the
"per person" portions of his insurance policy.'68 Under the reasoning
of Bell v. State Farm, the plaintiffs, Carper and Moomaw, were allowed to recover under the medical payment provisions of each of
their own policies; likewise, a third party, Boggs, was allowed to stack
"'
the medical payments payable for each of his two insured cars. 69
Despite the liberal interpretation of MEDPAY coverage stacking in
Moomaw, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has held
that automobile guests may not recover medical payments through an
automobile host's separate policies; 70 the court held that there is no
statutory or public policy against anti-stacking in this state.' 7' Indeed,
the court held that an insurer may incorporate any anti-stacking language into MEDPAY provisions.'72
B. Subrogation of Medical Payments Claims
Subrogation of MEDPAY claims is allowed in West Virginia.'73
In The Traveler's Indemnity Co. v. Rader,74 the MEDPAY insurer
wanted to recover the payments made to its MEDPAY insured for
medical expenses. The insured argued that MEDPAY subrogation was

165. Id. at 701.
166. Id. at 697.
167. 207 S.E.2d 147 (W. Va. 1974).

168. Id.
169. Moomaw, 379 F. Supp. at 701.
170. Keiper v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 429 S.E.2d 66 (W. Va. 1993).
171. Id. at 68.
172. Id. at 70. See Deel v. Sweeney, 383 S.E.2d 92 (W. Va. 1989), for a more substantial elaboration of the court's policy on following statutory guidelines and the leeway
allowed insurers outside the boundaries of legislative intent.
173. The Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Rader, 166 S.E.2d 157 (W. Va. 1969).
174. Id.
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illegal as it would constitute an assignment of a cause of action.175
The court held that subrogation of MEDPAY claims is not an assignment of a cause of action and is perfectly legal in West Virginia. 7 "
The insured must pay back all of the duplicated MEDPAY coverages
he has collected to his MEDPAY insurer.
In Bell v. Federal Kemper Insurance Co., 77 the southern district
court held that the subrogated MEDPAY insurer must pay its proportionate share of attorney fees and expenses. Thus, the tort plaintiffthe MEDPAY insured - may "knock off' one-third of the MEDPAY
amount which was to be repaid to the MEDPAY insurer."'8 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia adopted Bell v. Federal
Kemper in Federal Kemper Insurance Co. v. Arnold,"9 and made it
the West Virginia rule. The subrogation amount must bear the pro-rata
share of the costs of obtaining recovery, as the reimbursement "should
reflect the cost to the covered person of obtaining a recovery against
the person at fault." 8 ' In Arnold, the insured's cost of recovery was
a one-third contingent fee; thus, the court held that the subrogation
amount should be reduced pro-rata by one-third."" Presumptively,
then, the correct pro-rata reduction is a one-third reduction according
to Arnold.
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dairyland Insurance Co."8
is the latest entry in the MEDPAY arena. Nationwide's MEDPAY
insured was involved in an automobile accident with Dairyland's liability insured tortfeasor and Nationwide paid MEDPAY to its insured.'
Nationwide put Dairyland on notice of its MEDPAY subrogation rights
by letter, stating that it was seeking reimbursement of its medical pay-

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
this case.

Id. at 159.
Id. at 161.
693 F. Supp. 446 (S.D. NV. Va. 1988).
Id. at 450.
393 S.E.2d 669 (W. Va. 1990). The court also reaffirmed the Rader decision in
Id. at 671.

180. Id. at 671.
181. Id. at 672.
182. 445 S.E.2d 184 (f.
183. Id. at 186.

Va. 1994).
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ments. 84
' Dairyland settled with Nationwide's MEDPAY insured and
did nothing to honor or protect Nationwide's subrogation rights. The
Supreme Court of Appeals held that, where the plaintiff is unrepresented in settlement negotiations, the tortfeasor's liability carrier was responsible for the proper handling of the subrogation claim.'85 The
court held that the tortfeasor's insurance carrier was primarily responsible for the payment of the subrogation claim because it was aware of
Nationwide's claim before it obtained the MEDPAY insured's release. 86 The tortfeasor's insurer has a duty to act in good faith to
protect the MEDPAY insurer's subrogation rights.'87
Insurance companies currently argue that Nationwide trumps Arnold. Since the liability insurance company has a duty to protect the
MEDPAY insurer's fights, there is no need for Arnold's pro-rata sharing of the cost of collection. In other words, insurance companies now
argue that subrogation reimbursement is automatic and not dependant
on the plaintiff attorney's efforts. The aforementioned argument is
without merit, however. First, the plaintiff's attorney may up the settlement ante to reflect the Nationwide loss of the Arnold deduction. Second, subrogation is an equitable doctrine - Nationwide involved an
unrepresented MEDPAY insured. A represented MEDPAY insured is
still entitled to an Arnold deduction.
Questions may also arise where both the MEDPAY insured and
the liability insured are represented by the same insurance company.
Such was the case in Richards v. Allstate Insurance Co.,88 wherein
Allstate was the insurer for both the injured plaintiff and the tortfeasor.
Allstate sought repayment of medical payments made to the MEDPAY
insured from the settlement that the plaintiffs made with the tortfeasor.
The plaintiffs argued that Allstate had no right to reimbursement of
MEDPAY because Allstate could not enforce a right of subrogation
against its own insured tortfeasor. The Richards court held that "[n]o
right of subrogation can arise in favor of the insurer against its own

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id.
Id. at 187-88.
Id. at 188.
Nationwide, 445 S.E.2d at 188.
455 S.E.2d 803 (W. Va. 1995).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol97/iss3/5

34

Cady and Smith: West Virginia's Automobile Insurance Policy Laws: A Practitioner'

1995]

AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICYLAWS

insured," since subrogation only arises with respect to rights against
third parties. 89 The most obvious public policy reason for this is to
prevent the insurer from having a conflict of interest. An insurance
company may not assert a right of subrogation against its own insured,
but rather, should prevent a double recovery by inserting a clear and
unambiguous clause regarding reimbursement in its policies.
And finally, in Bell v. Federal Kemper,9 the MEDPAY insured
argued that she should not have to repay any of her MEDPAY because
she had not been "made whole" by her settlement with the tortfeasor.
The district court rejected Bell v. Federal Kemper's argument on the
grounds that she had, in fact, been made whole. This was because the
plaintiff had willingly entered into her own settlement agreement. Bell
v. Federal Kemper suggests that the "made whole rule" should be
applied to MEDPAY subrogation. The key West Virginia authority on
the made-whole rule is Kittle v. Icard,191 which held that DHS could
not get back any of the medical payments it made to a crippled infant
because the child had not been made whole by his settlement with the
tortfeasor. Because subrogation is an equitable doctrine, it may only be
allowed when no injustice will be done to the insured. Any loss of
under-reparations should be borne by the insurer because the insured
has paid his insurance company to assume that risk.'9 2
C. Exclusion of Coverage Provisions
A specific exclusionary clause which restricts the MEDPAY coverage may be held valid under current court decisions. 3 In fact, a specific exclusionary clause will be held valid as drafted, absent some
statute regulating coverage. 4 However, such exclusionary clauses are
to be strictly construed against the insurer in order that the purpose of
providing indemnity for the insured is not defeated. 95 Thus, any am-

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. at 805.
693 F. Supp. at 446.
405 S.E.2d 456 (W. Va. 1991).
Id. at 461.
Carney, 434 S.E.2d at 379.
Id.
Id. See also National Mut. Ins. Co. v. McMahon & Sons, Inc., 356 S.E.2d 488
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biguities in the exclusionary clause should be construed in favor of the
insured.
V. UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE (UM)
Uninsured motorist (UM) coverage is mandatory in West Virginia.'96 The purpose of UM coverage is to ensure that the burden of
loss for accidents caused by financially irresponsible motorists is distributed among the owners of all motor vehicles in this state.'97 The
West Virginia legislature enacted this state's UM policy requirements
on June 6, 1967, requiring that every automobile liability insurance
policy contain UM provisions. 9 Effective April 1, 1982, the West
Virginia Legislature made UM coverage elective; such coverage had to
be offered but could be waived by the insured in writing.'99 Then, in
1986, UM coverage again became mandatory. At present, UM coverage
is mandatory for all automobile liability policies.2"0 Of course, UM
provisions are to be liberally construed to promote indemnification.20 '
UM coverage is based on the "Tulley/Bell premise," which involves three areas: statutory conformity, voidness, and unjust enrichment. In Bell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,22 the
court held that any insurance provisions which conflict with West Virginia Code § 33-6-31 are void and ineffective. Further, in Tulley v.

(W. Va. 1987) (holding that ambiguous exclusionary clauses must be construed in favor of
the insured and against the insurer).
196. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(b) (1992).
197. Bell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 207 S.E.2d 147 (W. Va. 1974). The court
has held that an uninsured motorist policy should be given liberal construction for the purpose of protecting innocent victims from the hardships caused by negligent, financially irresponsible drivers. Plymale v. Adkins, 429 S.E.2d 246 (W. Va. 1993).
198. 1967 W. Va. Acts 97 (codified as amended at W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31 (1992)).
Initially, UM coverage minimums were 10/20/5. Those minimums have grown to the present
level of 20/40/10; mandatory UM coverage has remained at this level since 1979.
199. 1982 W. Va. Acts 106.
200. 1988 W. Va. Acts 75.
201. Plymale v. Adkins, 429 S.E.2d 246 (W. Va. 1993) (holding that where the plaintiff failed to name the unknown "hit-and-run" driver in the complaint, the plaintiff was
allowed to amend the complaint because UM coverage is to be liberally construed and is
remedial in nature).
202. 207 S.E.2d 147 (W. Va. 1974).
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State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,203 the southern district
court held that any administrative rules promulgated must not conflict
with the statute from which they are derived. Such regulations may
also not supply remedies for omissions within the enabling statute. This
emphasis on statutory conformity forms the first aspect of the
Tulley/Bell premise that an insurance policy must comply with statutory
requirements. Thus, policy provisions which conflict with the statute,
either by adding requirements or by circumventing the statutory mandates, are void and ineffective. Second, the Bell v. State Farm court
set forth the following voidness principle: if an exclusionary clause is
not expressly permitted by statute, then such exclusions are impliedly
void.2 °4 The voidness principle is based on the court's characterization
of insurance contracts as bordering on contracts of adhesion. A nonconforming UM provision is void. Finally, the Tulley/Bell premise is
concerned with the theory of unjust enrichment - an insurance company would be "unjustly enriched" if it was not required to pay up to the
coverage limits of a policy where the policy premiums have already
been collected. Therefore, in order to be fully valid, an insurance policy should follow the statutory mandates; these requirements are discussed in detail below.
A. Mandatory Offer of Minimum and Optional UM Coverage
Insurers in the State of West Virginia are required to offer UM
coverage. UM coverage is a mandatory part of every automobile insurance policy issued.20 5 This UM coverage must at least meet the minimum coverage requirements set forth by the WVMVSRA - $20,000
per person; $40,000 per accident; and $10,000 per property damage.206 In addition to the mandatory minimum coverage, an insurer
must also offer an option for a higher dollar amount of UM coverage
than the minimal level - up to $100,000 per person; $300,000 per
accident; and $50,000 per property damage. 0 7 Also, the insurer must

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

345 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D. W. Va. 1972).
Bell v. State Farm, 207 S.E.2d at 149.
W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(b) (1992).
W. VA. CODE § 17D-4-2 (1991). See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
Bias v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 365 S.E.2d 789, 790 (W. Va. 1987). This offer
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offer a third option for both UM and UIM coverage up to the dollar
limits of the liability insurance purchased by the insured. °8
In West Virginia, a motorist is an uninsured motorist if he meets
any one of the following six defining criteria. First, the uninsured
motorist may be a driver with no insurance." 9 Second, the uninsured
motorist may have some insurance, but not up to the mandatory minimum of 20/40/10.210 Third, the uninsured motorist may, in fact, have
insurance, but his insurance company may deny coverage for the acci21
dent; that motorist is considered to be an uninsured motorist. '
Fourth, the motorist is also considered to be uninsured where he can
produce no "self-insurance" certificate, as required by statute for common carriers. 212 Fifth, a motorist may be classified as uninsured
where- the owner or operator of the vehicle is unknown, 23 and where
there was a "hit and run" accident.2 4 Sixth, a motorist may be classified as uninsured where the insurance proceeds are uncollectible, in
part or on the whole, because the insurance company is insolvent or in
receivership.2 5
Since the insurer is required to offer optional coverage above the
minimum UM coverage requirements, the insurer must prove an effective offer, and a knowing and intelligent waiver by the insured of the
optional coverage, or by operation of law the optional coverage limits
become a part of the policy. 216 To prove an "effective offer," the in-

of optional coverage should also include a $300 deductible for property damage. W. VA.
CODE § 33-6-31(b) (1992).
208. Again, this offer of optional coverage should include a $300 deductible for property damage. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(b) (1992).
209. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(c)(i) (1992).
210. Id.
211. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(c)(ii) (1992).
212. W. VA. CODE § 17D-6-2 (1991).
213. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(c) (1992).
214. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(e)(iii) (1992). In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nor-

man, 446 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va. 1994), the court held that the physical contact in a hit-andrun accident must be a "close and substantial physical nexus" between the unidentified hitand-run automobile and the insured's car. There is no hit-and-run where the insured's car
strikes a tire, or any other immobile object or debris lying in the roadway.
215.

W. VA. CODE § 33-6-310) (1992).

216. Bias, 365 S.E.2d at 791.
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surance company should "place the purchaser in the position to make
an informed rejection of an offer to purchase [UM] insurance."2 7 The
insurer's offer must be made in a commercially reasonable manner, so
that the insured is provided with adequate information with which to
make a decision.2"' The offer must state, in definite, intelligible, and
specific terms, the nature of the coverage offered, the coverage limits,
and the costs involved. 9
B. Omnibus Clauses
An omnibus clause extends UM coverage from the named insured
to other *persons, "while resident of the same household, the spouse of
any named insured, and relatives of either while in a motor vehicle or
otherwise. 22 ° By statute, any attempt to limit omnibus coverage is
void.22 In Bell v. State Farm, the offending insurance policy contained a limitation clause which excluded UM coverage for anyone
occupying an owned-but-not-insured motor vehicle.222 Plaintiffs
Hubert Murray and Shirley Bell carried separate automobile liability
insurance policies with State Farm.2" The accident which gave rise to
Bell v. State Farm occurred while Shirley Bell was operating a motorcycle which she owned, but which was not insured. 2 4 After the accident, plaintiffs brought an action against the UM and recovered a
$40,000 judgment.2 5 Upon demand of payment, State Farm refused
to pay under either policy.226 The court held that the owned-but-not-

217. WIDISS, supra note 2, § 32.6, at 33.
218. Id. See also State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wannamaker, 354 S.E.2d 555 (S.C.

1987).
219. Bias, 365 S.E.2d at 791.
220. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 175 S.E.2d 478 (W. Va.
1970) (holding that omnibus clauses should be given liberal construction because their purpose is to provide coverage for persons driving vehicles whose owners have obtained insurance); W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(c) (1992).
221. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(a) (1992). See Bell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
207 S.E.2d 147 (W. Va. 1974).
222. Bell v. State Farm, 207 S.E.2d at 149.
223. Id. at 148.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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insured limitation on omnibus coverage was void. The statute did not
allow such an exclusion, hence the exclusion was void. Bell v. State
Farm held that an omnibus clause must conform to statutory mandates. 7
C. Guests
Any exclusion of guests in a UM policy are void under West
Virginia Code § 33-6-31(). 22 8 By statute, guests are included in any
UM coverage. A guest is defined as any person within the insured
automobile who is using the vehicle under the consent provisions of
the "Tulley/Bell' premise. 229 Guests must be covered by the UM policy, or that policy is void.
D. Other Insurance Clauses
An "other insurance" clause allows the insurance company to limit
its payment of policy benefits when the insured has other UM coverage." The Tulley/Bell premise voids "other insurance" clauses in
West Virginia. Any attempt to restrict coverage payment through an
"other insurance" clause is void. 23 ' The southern district court considered the issue of "other insurance" clauses in TulleyY Mr. Tulley
was negligently injured by a UM while driving his brother's automobile. 3 He thus had UM coverage from his own policy and his
brother's policy. Each policy had an excess UM "other insurance"
clause. The court held that West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(c) does not
allow other insurance clauses in UM policies, therefore, the clause was
void due to a lack of statutory conformity.234

227. Bell v. State Farm, 207 S.E.2d at 149.
228. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(c) (1992).
229. See supra notes 202-204 and accompanying text.

230. For background on "other insurance" clause development in West Virginia, see
supra notes 132-136 and accompanying text
231. Tulley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 345 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D. W. Va. 1972).
232. Id.
233. Id at 1124.
234. Id. at 1126.
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An injured insured may recover simultaneously under two policies
up to the limits of liability on each policy or up to the amount of
judgment against the uninsured tortfeasor, whichever is lowest. 5 Under Bell v. State Farm, any limitation clauses or "excess clauses" within the insurance contract are void under West Virginia Code § 33-631.236 In Bell v. State Farm, the insurance company maintained that
an exclusionary clause was a fair and reasonable bargained-for agreement within the insurance contract. The court reasoned that insurance
contracts are "notoriously complex, ... and border on the status of
contracts of adhesion,"" and thus are suspect to the interpreting
court. Because the insured and insurer do not stand in pari causa, the
insured's agreement to such limitations lacks completeness in relation
to the insurer's position.3 8 The court held that it was only fair to the
insured that he be able to recover up to the policy limits on each policy he obtains, when the premiums of each policy are kept up to date
as "any other result would lead to an unjust enrichment of insurance
companies." 9
In a later case, Moomaw v. State Farm Automobile Insurance
Co.,24 the court held that not only was an insured allowed to recover
from two policies simultaneously, but that the insured was also entitled
to medical payments. In fact, the Moomaw court held that contractual
provisions which purport to reduce UM coverage by the amount of
medical payments already advanced to the insured are void.24
Moomaw also follows the Tulley/Bell premise, holding that any attempt
to circumvent statutory mandates is void; thus, any "other insurance"
clause in a UM policy is void.242

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
was held

Bell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 207 S.E.2d 147 (W. Va. 1974).
Id. at 150.
Id.
Id. at 151.
Id.
Moomaw, 379 F. Supp. at 702.
Id. at 703. The court relied on its earlier reasoning in Tulley where such a clause
to be void and inoperative.

242. Id.
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E. Stacking
Stacking of automobile insurance coverage refers to the piling up
of multiple coverages from multiple policies, or the piling up of coverage of multiple vehicles in a single policy, when there is only one
loss. If stacking is allowed, the insured can recover up to the amount
of policy limits of each insurance policy. Under indemnity principles,
an insured should only be able to recover up to the amount of his
injury. However, some insurance policies do not cover the full amount
of substantial damages; thus, if the insured can reach several policies,
or the coverage of several vehicles, the likelihood of full compensation
is much greater than where stacking is prohibited.
The stacking issue may arise in various ways under UM coverage.
First, the insured may have been a passenger in a vehicle he did not
own. In that case, the insured may try to recover from both his own
policy (as the named insured) and the policy of the driver (as an omnibus insured). Second, the insured may have two separate policies for
two different vehicles. If the insured is injured in one of these vehicles, she may attempt to recover under both policies through
"interpolicy horizontal stacking." '43 Third, the insured may have paid
multiple premiums under one policy for multiple vehicles. If injured,
the insured may attempt multiple recoveries under multiple UM
coverages. 2' Fourth, an insured may seek to recover under multiple
policies owned by someone else. In each of these cases, the insured
would seek to stack coverages. All of these scenarios may occur where
multiple policies or coverages are at issue.
There are only five cases dealing with the stacking of UM
coverage in West Virginia. Tulley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. 45 was the first case to address the issue of stacking in
West Virginia. In Tulley, the southern district court held that anti-stacking provisions are void under West Virginia Code § 33-6-31.246

243.
244.
245.
246.

See supra note 137.
This is known as "intrapolicy horizontal stacking." See supra note 137.
345 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D. W. Va. 1972).
Id. at 1127.
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Building on the decision in Tulley, the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia held, in Bell v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.,247
that an insurance policy which attempts to defeat stacking is repugnant
to the UM statute. In Bell v. State Farm, the court also held that an
insured may collect on as many policies as provide coverage. The
court justified this holding by stating that "[a]ny other result would
lead to the unjust enrichment of insurance companies."248 In Moomaw
v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co.,249 where the insureds were
covered by more than one policy, the court held that the insureds
could recover on each policy up to the limits of each policy or up to
the amount of judgment obtained against the insurer.
Anti-stacking of UM coverages reached its zenith in State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co. v. YoulerY0 Anti-stacking language was
held void by the court under West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(b).251
The court followed its previous reasoning in the Tulley/Bell premise,
holding that insurance policy language must conform to the statutory
mandates.252 Because anti-stacking language in the policy conflicts
with the intent of West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(b), that language is
void." 3
However, in the most recent case, anti-stacking proponents won a
round. Russell v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co.24 held that
neither statute nor public policy required the stacking of UM coverage
when the insured received a million dollar discount on his insurance
policies." In Russell, the insured got the benefit of the bargain
through the discount.25 6 The court concentrated on the fact that premiums had been paid on only one policy, thus the insurer was not

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

207 S.E.2d 147 (W. Va. 1974).
Id. at 151.
379 F. Supp. 697 (S.D. W. Va. 1974).
396 S.E.2d 737 (W. Va. 1990).
Id. at 745.
Id. at 746.
Id.
422 S.E.2d 803 (W. Va. 1992).
Id.
Id.
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likely to be unjustly enriched by this payment." 7 In Youler, there
were two insurance policies for which premiums had been paid and the
court allowed stacking; while in Russell, because there was only one
policy for two cars with a multi-vehicle discount, the court did not
allow stacking."
F. Set Off
West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(b) provides, in pertinent part, that
an automobile liability policy shall provide an option for UM or UIM
coverage up to the amount of bodily injury liability coverage and property damage liability coverage "without set off against the insured's
policy or any other policy."259 Section 33-6-31(b) also provides that
"[n]o sums payable as a result of UM coverage shall be reduced by
260
payments made under the insured's policy or any other policy.
This provision was added to § 33-6-31(b) in 1982 to codify principles
of the common law.26
In Tulley, the southern district court considered an action to determine a plaintiffs right to recover UM coverage without medical payments set off.262 The court held that policy language which provided
for the "reduction of insurance amounts by sums paid under the policies due to the insured's 'medical expenses' . . . " was void and inoperative.2 63 That is, the court held that damages awarded to the plaintiff cannot be reduced by the sums paid to him from his own medical
payments coverage. 211 West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(b) does not allow the set off of medical payments coverage.2 65 Thus, under the

257. Id. at 806.
258. Id; Youler, 396 S.E.2d at 746.
259. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(b) (1992). See Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 438
S.E.2d 28, 35 (W. Va. 1993) (holding that set off of UM benefits is improper as a means

to reduce a tortfeasor's damages under the collateral source rule).
260. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(b) (1992).
261. Id.
262. Tulley, 345 F. Supp. at 1123.
263. Id. at 1129. See W. VA. CODE §§ 17D-4-2, 29A-1-1, 31-1-71, 33-2-71, 33-4-12,
33-6-31(b), (d) (1994).
264. Tulley, 345 F. Supp. at 1130.
265. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(b) (1992).
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Tulley/Bell premise, the policy language must conform to the statute or
it is void.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia did not consider
the set-off question until 1990 in Youler.266 The court held that any
"set-off language in the insured's policy which purportedly reduces the
UM coverage limits by the tortfeasor's liability coverage payments" is
void.267 West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(b) - the UM section - sets
the West Virginia public policy promoting full indemnification by
statute.268 Youler clarifies the West Virginia standard for set off in
UM and UIM policies. Essentially, there are two possible approaches
269 (1) the tortfeasor's liability coverage is set off against
to set off."
the UM coverage limits;270 or (2) the tortfeasor's liability insurance is
set off against the amount of damages sustained by the injured person,
but not the plaintiff's UM coverage.27 West Virginia follows the second approach.272
The holding in Youler is further supported by the court's treatment
of the collateral source rule in Johnson v. General Motors
273 The collateral source rule operates to preclude the offCorporation.
setting of UM or UIM benefits. 4 This provides protection for the injured insured by preventing his insurer from taking advantage of payments received by the insured as a result of his own contractual ar-

266. Youler, 396 S.E.2d at 737.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 750.
269. Id. at 747.
270. This type of approach is known as "reduction-type" or "decreasing-layer" UM
coverage. This approach is premised on the idea that the purpose of UM coverage is to put
the insured in the same position he or she would have occupied had the tortfeasor's liability
insurance limits been the same as the UM coverage limits purchased by the insured. Id.
271. Youler, 396 S.E.2d at 748. Under this approach, the insurer providing UM coverage is liable to its injured insured for any excess, up to the limits of the UM coverage.
This type of UM legislation is sometimes called "excess-type" or "floating-layer" UM coverage. It is premised on the idea that the injured party is entitled to recover under his or her
own UM coverage to the extent that the tortfeasor's liability insurance is insufficient to
compensate the injured party fully for the loss; this compensation is subject only to the
limits of the UM coverage. Id.
272. Id. at 749. See also W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(b) (1992).
273. 438 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1993).
274. Id. at 36.
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rangements entirely independent of the insurance contract at issue. 75
The rationale behind this rule is that the tortfeasor should not be allowed to minimize damages by offsetting the payments received by an
injured independent party through his own independent contractual
arrangements.27 Thus, under Johnson, the offsetting of UM benefits
is precluded when the UM benefits come from an entirely independent
27 7
source.

G. Subrogation and Consent to Settle
West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(f) provides, in pertinent part, that
"an insurer paying a claim under the endorsement or provisions required under subsection (b) of this section shall be subrogated to the
rights of the insured to whom such claim was paid against the person
causing such injury, death or damage to the extent that payment was
made. '2 7' This means that the insured's UM insurer may recover its
payments, made to the insured, from the uninsured motorist(s). This of
course depends on whether the uninsured-motorist-tortfeasor has any
assets; if not, there is no subrogation. Ordinarily, the UM company
will waive its subrogation rights so that its plaintiff may settle with the
UM tortfeasor for whatever assets the UM tortfeasor may have.' 9 In
Postlethwait v. Boston Old Colony Insurance Co.,280 the court considered the issue of an insured suing his insurance company without first
obtaining a formal judgment against the tortfeasor. The court held that
a plaintiff can directly sue his or her insurance company only after he
or she obtains the UM company's waiver of subrogation rights and

275. Id.; see also Ratlief v. Yokum, 280 S.E.2d 584 (W. Va. 1981) (defining the collateral source rule).
276. Id. at 590.
277. An example of this would be an individual contract for UM insurance with a
second insurer. The primary liability insurance carrier would not be able to offset the UM
benefits from the second policy under the collateral source rule.
278. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(f) (1992). Subsection (b) refers to the code section dealing with UM and UIM coverages. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(b) (1992).
279. In West Virginia, the court has recognized subrogation as an equitable doctrine.
Kittle v. Icard, 405 S.E.2d 456 (W. Va. 1991).
280. 432 S.E.2d 802 (W. Va. 1993).
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after the insured settles
with the tortfeasor's liability company for the
8'
limits.
policy
full
The court, in Arndt v. Burdette,282 has held that a "consent to
settle" provision pertaining to the insured's UM coverage is a valid
and enforceable means by which an insurer may protect its statutorily
mandated right to subrogate claims. Thus, an insured must first obtain
written consent from the insurer prior to settling a claim with the
tortfeasor;283 this protects the insurance company's subrogation rights
against the tortfeasor"' Where an insured settles and releases the
tortfeasor's liability insurer without the consent of his UM insurer, the
insured prejudices the UM insurer's statutory right to subrogation.285
The court's latest statement on subrogation and "consent-to-settle"
provisions is the powerful State ex rel. Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Karl.286 "Consent-to-settle" provisions are common, and protect the
insurer's statutory right of subrogation. Such provisions are designed to
foreclose a collusive settlement between the plaintiff and the
tortfeasor's liability insurer. 87 Karl prohibits such a collusive settlement between these parties.
H

Statute of Limitations

The plaintiff's UM coverage is not an alternative to the
tortfeasor's liability coverage. An action for "willful breach of contractual duties to settle a claim for UM coverage" is governed by the
statute of limitations for tort actions.288 In Harman v. State Farm
281. Id. While the UM company may waive its right to subrogation, such a waiver
may not be obtained by the threat of the tortfeasor's liability carrier to withhold settlement
of the claim. The primary liability carrier has a duty to deal in good faith both with its
insured and with the UM carrier, and may subject itself to a bad faith suit by making such
a demand and refusing to settle if such a demand is not met. Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 396 S.E.2d 766 (W. Va. 1990).
282. 434 S.E.2d 394 (W. Va. 1993).
283. Id. at 399.
284. Id. at 400.
285. Id.
286. 437 S.E.2d 749 (W. Va. 1993).
287. Id. See also WIDISS, supra note 2, § 17.2.
288. Harman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 434 S.E.2d 391 (W. Va. 1993). The
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Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,289 the plaintiff maintained that his
action for UM benefits should be governed by the ten year statute of
limitations for contract actions, rather than by the two year statute of
limitations for tort. The court held that the tort statute of limitations
applied. Essentially, the plaintiff had missed the statute of limitations
deadline for his suit against the tortfeasor, and thus attempted recovery
from his own UM policy. Although he had the opportunity to settle,
the plaintiff did not settle his claim for any amount and let the statute
of limitations run. The court found that the only reason Mr. Harman
filed a claim against his own UM insurer was because he failed to file
a timely suit against the tortfeasor.290 The plaintiff tried to sue his
own UM carrier to recover from his own UM coverage; unfortunately,
the plaintiff was not successful.
However, a direct action against a UM insurer is a contract action
governed by the contract statute of limitations.29' In Plumley v. May,
the court addressed the issue of a direct action against a UM insurer,
and held that a plaintiff is not precluded from suing his UM insurer
within the ten year statute of limitations for contract actions if the
plaintiff had settled with the tortfeasor's liability company for the full
amount of the policy and had obtained from his UM insurer a waiver
of the insurer's right of subrogation against the tortfeasor.292
L Process, Suit, and Joinder
Process, suit, and joinder are confusing under the statutes and the
common law decisions in West Virginia. West Virginia Code § 33-631(d) provides several guidelines for these tricky issues.293 Where the
plaintiff sues the tortfeasor and the plaintiff asserts that the tortfeasor is
a UM, the plaintiff must serve - not sue, not join - his own UM

tort statute of limitations is two years.
289. Id. at 393. Mr. Harman filed his suit approximately three and one-half years after
the accident occurred.
290. Id. at 394.
291. Plumley v. May, 434 S.E.2d 406 (W. Va. 1993). The contract statute of limitations is ten years.
292. Id. at 409.

293.

W. VA. CODE

§ 33-6-31(d) (1992).
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insurance company. That UM insurer may appear in the name of the
defendant (generally always), or in its own name (rarely). If the UM is
an unknown, hit-and-run "John Doe," then the plaintiff must sue John
Doe and serve - not sue, not join - his own UM company. There
are two points which must be emphasized: (1) the plaintiff must serve
not sue, not join - his own UM company; and (2) the plaintiff's
own UM insurer is involved in the case completely adverse to the
interests of its own insured, the plaintiff. Thus, in Davis v. Robertson,294 the court held that the insured cannot - during a direct action - sue his own insurer until the plaintiff has obtained a judgment
against the UM tort defendant.
In Postlethwait v. Boston Old Colony Insurance Co.,295 the court
slightly modified its holding in Davis and held that a judgment against
the tortfeasor is not necessary before the plaintiff may sue his own
UM insurer. If the plaintiff has settled with the tortfeasor for the full
amount of the tortfeasor's policy with a waiver of subrogation rights
from the UM insurer, then the plaintiff may sue his own UM insurer.296 Finally, in Plymale v. Adkins,297 the court held that the plaintiff could amend his complaint to add a John Doe defendant, even
after the statute of limitations had run.
J. Choice of Law
West Virginia follows simple conflicts of law rules. Generally, for
torts, the substantive law of the place in which the tort occurred - lex
loci delicti - will be applied. For contracts, the law of the place
where the contract was formed - lex loci contractus - will be applied.
Where the UM coverage process is a tort process, the law of the
state in which the accident occurs applies to establish legal liabili-

294. 332 S.E.2d 819 (W. Va. 1985).
295. Postlethwait,432 S.E.2d at 802.
296. Id. at 804.
297. 429 S.E.2d 246, 249 (W. Va. 1993). The court held that the insurer was not prejudiced by this amendment because the insurer had notice of the suit before the statute of

limitations had run.
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ty.2 9' In Perkins v. Doe,299 the court considered a "John Doe" suit
wherein the accident occurred when the plaintiff swerved out of the
way of an unknown motorist; the accident occurred with no physical
contact between the plaintiffs' vehicle and that of the unknown motorist. The accident occurred in Virginia, but the insurance contract was
formed in West Virginia. Because Virginia law allowed for recovery
without a showing of "physical contact," unlike West Virginia law, the
court held that the suit initiated by the plaintiffs was an action in tort,
and thus was subject to the traditional choice of law principles."0
The court applied the conflicts doctrine of lex loci delicti, holding that
the law of the place of wrong was to be applied in tort cases.30 '
Thus, the court permitted the plaintiff to recover for his injuries under
30 2
Virginia law by applying the law of tort.
Where the benefits under the insurance policy are at issue, contract
law is applied. 3 In Lee v. Saliga, the court held that issues relating
to policy coverage, rather than liability, are to be resolved under the
conflicts of laws principles which apply to contracts; thus, UM coverage in a policy written in Pennsylvania is interpreted according to
Pennsylvania law.0 This is so even when the accident takes place in
West Virginia." 5 Further, the court has held that where UM benefits
are at issue, questions are to be resolved under the laws of the state of
formation of the contract, unless another state has a more significant

298. Perkins v. Doe, 350 S.E.2d 711 (W. Va. 1986).
299. Id. at 713. In Perkins, the accident in question occurred in Virginia. The plaintiffs
were residents of West Virginia and their policy was written in West Virginia. Virginia's
"John Doe" law does not require actual physical contact between the hit-and-run vehicle and
the claimant's vehicle. Doe v. Brown, 125 S.E.2d 159 (Va. 1962). West Virginia's "John

Doe" law requires a "substantial physical nexus," or actual physical contact, in order for a
plaintiff to recover. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31 (1992).
300. Perkins, 350 S.E.2d at 713.
301. Id. Perkins deviates from the general norm of applying contracts law doctrine to
insurance cases. Perhaps this is due to Mr. Perkins unfortunate circumstances after the accident, as he was left a quadriplegic due to the negligence of an unknown driver.
302. The plaintiffs would not have been able to recover under West Virginia law. If
the court had applied contract law to this conflicts of law quandary, the plaintiffs would not
have been able to recover any of his loss.
303. Lee v. Saliga, 373 S.E.2d 345 (W. Va. 1988).
304. Id. at 349.
305. Id.
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30 6
policy.
public
Virginia's
West
to
contrary
is
state of formatioh
K

Notice Requirements

The notice requirements of West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(e) affect
only the contractual relationship between the UM insured and the insurer. 7 "Hit-and-run" accidents require special measures; there are
two statutory notice provisions for "hit-and-run" accidents. First, the
insured must provide notice to the police or the Department of Motor
Vehicles of the hit-and-run.0 8 Second, the insured must provide notice to the insurance company of the existence of a cause of action for
damages against the owner or operator of the absconding vehicle." 9
To recover under UM hit-and-run coverage, the insured must notify his
insurer within sixty days after the accident. 10
For all UM accidents, notice must be given to the insurer within a
reasonable time period. In the typical case for inadequate notice,
the insured must present evidence showing the reason for the delay in
giving notice. 12 Once this prerequisite is satisfied, the insurer must
demonstrate some prejudice from the insured's failure to give timely
notice; if the insurer fails to present evidence of prejudice, the

306. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Triangle Indus., Inc., 390 S.E.2d 562 (W. Va. 1990). See
also Johnson v. Neal, 418 S.E.2d 349 (W. Va. 1992) (holding that Virginia law controlled
where a Virginia motorist was killed in a collision with an uninsured West Virginia motorist
because the policy was issued in Virginia by a Virginia company to a Virginia resident);
Adkins v. Sperry, 437 S.E.2d 284 (W. Va. 1993) (holding that Ohio law applied because it
was the state wherein the policy was issued and where the insured was principally located,
thus West Virginia did not have a more significant relationship to the transaction or to the
parties).
307. Lusk v. Doe, 338 S.E.2d 375 (W. Va. 1985). These notice provisions are not to
inure to the benefit of a presently unknown tortfeasor in any way. Id.
308. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(e)(i) (992).
309. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(e)(ii) (1992).
310. Id.
311. Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Voshel, 428 S.E.2d 542 (W. Va. 1993) (holding that, in a
UM case, prejudice to the investigative interests of the insurer is a factor to be considered,
along with the reasons for the delay and the length of delay in notification, in determining
the overall reasonableness in giving notice of an accident).
312. Id.
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insured's failure to give timely notice will not bar recovery.31 However, if the insurer does present evidence of prejudice, then the reasonableness of insured's failure to give notice becomes an issue for the
trier of fact. 1 4 If prejudice is shown, the insured will be barred from
making a claim.315
VI. UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE (UIM)
Most states have some form of UIM coverage. Nationally, the
growth of UIM coverage has been linked to the growing amount of
accidents leaving insured motorists without some form of an economic
safety net because the negligent tortfeasor was underinsured. The purpose of UIM coverage is a policy of full compensation for the innocent victim of an automobile accident.
UIM coverage was added in West Virginia in 1982.316 While UM
coverage is mandatory, UIM coverage is not.317 It is, however, mandatory that an insurer offer UIM coverage to its insured. The insured
may reject UIM coverage, and the insurance company must prove a
knowing waiver on the part of the insured to satisfy this mandatory
offer requirement. UIM coverage allows the insured, if he chooses, to
protect himself from other drivers who are underinsured.
The key decision regarding UIM coverage in West Virginia is
Deel v. Sweeney." 8 In Deel, the court stated that the purpose of UIM
insurance is to allow the insured to protect himself, if he chooses to do
so, against losses incurred as a result of the negligence of an underinsured driver. 3 9 Because UIM coverage is optional, the insurance company and the insured motorist must negotiate the terms of the UIM
coverage. The terms, conditions, and premiums charged are those terms
for which the parties contract - placing the insurance company in the

313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

Id.
Id. See also Youler, 396 S.E.2d at 745.
Dairyland, 428 S.E.2d at 546.
W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(b) (1992).
UIM coverage has been optional since it was adopted in 1982. Id.
383 S.E.2d 92 (W. Va. 1989).
Id. at 95.
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driver's seat of policy provisions offered.32 An insurance company
may limit its oUIM liability, as long as such limitations do not conflict
with the statutory law.32 Thus, UIM policies vary widely among the
various insurance companies and the clients with which they contract.
A. Mandatory Offer of Optional UIM Coverage
UIM coverage is optional in West Virginia. It must be offered by
the insurer, although it may be rejected by the insured. The insurer has
the burden of proof of a commercially reasonable offer, and a knowing
and informed rejection of that offer.
In Bias v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,322 the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia considered UIM insurance, and
established several ground rules for the offer of optional UIM coverage
to the insured."z By statute, an insurance company must offer an option for both UM and UIM coverage up to the dollar amounts of liability insurance purchased by the insured.3 24 The insurance company
has the burden of proving that an effective offer was made, 5 and
that any rejection of this offer by the insured was knowing and informed. 26 The offer must state "in definite, intelligible, and specific
terms," the nature of the coverage offered, the coverage limits and the
costs involved.327 If the insurer cannot prove an effective and knowing waiver by the insured, the UIM coverage is included in the policy
32
by operation of law. 1
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. 365 S.E.2d 789 (W. Va. 1987).

323. Id. at 790.
324. W. VA. CODE §§ 33-6-31(b), 17D-4-2 (1994). The statutory language says that
UIM coverage shall be offered, thus the court has interpreted this language to mean that
such an offer is mandatory. Nelson v. West Virginia Pub. Employees Ins. Bd., 300 S.E.2d
86 (W. Va. 1982).
325. Bias, 365 S.E.2d at 791.
326. Id. The insurer's offer must be made in a commercially reasonable manner, so as
to provide the insured with adequate information to make an intelligent decision.
327. Id.
328. Id. See also Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v. Wheeler, 786 F. Supp. 565 (S.D. W. Va.
1992) (holding that the insured had not made a sufficient showing that higher benefit options were not presented to him as required to avoid summary judgment).
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The court has considered the various elements of the commercially
reasonable offer and the knowing and intelligent waiver. First, in Miller v. Hatton,329 the court held that the insurance company proved a
knowing and intelligent waiver where the insured explicitly had rejected UIM coverage. However, in Riffle v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co.,33 the court held that the insurance company failed to
prove a knowing waiver on the part of the plaintiffs; because the purpose of West Virginia Code § 33-6-31 is to provide insurance purchasers with the opportunity to purchase UIM insurance, any lack of a
knowing waiver causes UIM insurance to be added to the policy by
3 31
statute.
In July, 1993, the Insurance Commissioner for the State of West
Virginia issued an informational letter detailing the requirements for
the mandatory offer of optional UIM coverage.332 This letter summarizes the requirements of a 1993 bill (HB 2580) which details UIM
coverage requirements.33 HB 2580 requires that all insurers "make
available" to the named insured the optional limits of UM and UIM
coverage. The offer must be made using the forms provided by the Insurance Commissioner's office.334 UIM minimum coverage amounts
are $20,000 for bodily injury per person; $40,000 for bodily injury per
accident; and $10,000 for property damage per accident, with a maximum amount of UIM coverage equal to the insured's liability policy
limits. 335 This informational letter, and West Virginia Code § 33-631(d), should end all Bias disputes regarding UIM coverage - insurance companies should follow the requirements of the informational

The United States District Court for the Northern District held in a recent case that
the insured's spouse could effectively waive coverage under West Virginia law. Hall v.
Weisner, 844 F. Supp. 1120 (N.D. W. Va. 1994) (holding that rejection of UIM coverage
by spouse constitutes effective waiver if the intelligent and knowing requirement is satisfied).
329. 403 S.E.2d 782 (W. Va. 1991).
330. 410 S.E.2d 413 (W. Va. 1991).
331. Id.
332. Forms for Mandatory Offer of Optional Limits of Automobile Uninsured and UnderinsuredCoverage, Informational Letter No. 88 (July 1993).
333. The Informational Letter summarizes West Virginia House Bill 2580, which became effective on April 10, 1993.
334. The forms are provided in Informational Letter No. 88, supra note 332.
335. W. VA. CODE § 17D-4-2 (1991).
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letter and Bias in order to sustain a summary judgment motion where
UIM coverage was waived.
B. Definition of UIM
West Virginia Code §§ 33-6-31(b)(i) and (ii) define UIM coverage: an UIM is a motorist with liability insurance coverage but the
motorist's liability limits are (a) less than the limits of the injured
plaintiffs UIM insurance or (b) the motorist's liability limits have been
reduced below the injured plaintiffs IM limits by payments to others
injured in the same accident. 6
The first case on interpreting the UIM definition in West Virginia
was Stone v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Co., which held that West
Virginia Code § 33-6-31(b)(i) and (ii) mean plainly what they say. In
Stone, the southern district court held that an insured could not recover
under his IM policy where the tortfeasor's liability coverage limits
equalled the insured's 1IM coverage limits.338 In Hines v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. , 3 the northern district court held
that in order to recover 1IM benefits, the tortfeasor must be underinsured, by definition, as a matter of law.34° In Hines, the tortfeasor
had liability insurance in excess of the plaintiff's 1IM limits. Because
the tortfeasor had liability coverage which was not exhausted by the
claimants, the plaintiff could not recover from his 1IM insurinjured
34 1
er.
In 1990, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia decided
the key case for the definition of 1IM coverage, State Automobile
Mutual Insurance Co. v. YoulerY12 In a revolutionary decision, the
court held that the statutory revision of West Virginia Code § 33-6-31,
which occurred in 1988, provided a clarification of the legislative in-

336. W. VA. CODE §§ 33-6-31(b)(i), (ii) (1992).
337. 654 F. Supp. 205 (S.D. W. Va. 1986).

338. Id. at 207.
339.
340.
341.
342.

742 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. W. Va. 1990).
Id. at 346.
Id.
396 S.E.2d 737 (W. Va. 1990).
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tent for UIM coverage - to provide full indemnification to individuals
injured by the negligent operation of motor vehicles by motorists who
are not sufficiently insured. 3" The court held that the amount of UIM
policy payment due to the insured was equal to the total damages due
the plaintiff less the tortfeasor's liability limits.344

In Pristavec v. Wesoeld Insurance Co.,345 the court held that
UIM insurance coverage is activated when the amount of damages sustained by the injured plaintiff exceeds the amount of the tortfeasor's
liability insurance which is actually available to the injured party.
Pristavec extends the Youler definition of UIM by holding that a
tortfeasor may achieve "underinsured motor vehicle status" where the
tortfeasor's liability insurance which is actually available is less than
the amount of damages sustained by the injured person. 46 After
Pristavec and Youler, UIM status is not determined by the comparison
of the tortfeasor's available liability limits and the plaintiffs UIM
limits, as required by the statutory definition. Rather, "UIM status" is
determined by the comparison of the tortfeasor's liability limits and the
plaintiff's damages.
C. Omnibus Clauses
There is only one case regarding omnibus clauses as they relate to
UIM coverage Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Arbogast. 7 In
Transamerica, the northern district court held that an "owned but not
insured" exclusion would be held valid where the exclusionary language was unambiguous in the insured's UIM policy. 48 The
Transamerica decision is contrary to that made in Bell v. State Farm,

343. Id. at 751.
344. Id. Therefore, under Youler, the injured insured may recover under a UIM policy
where that insured's UIM limits exceed the tortfeasor's liability limits.
345. 400 S.E.2d 575 (W. Va. 1990).
346. Id. at 578. However, the court has limited the application of the UIM statute. In
Cook v. McDowell County Emergency Ambulance Serv. Auth., Inc., 445 S.E.2d 197 (W.
Va. 1994), the court held that W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(b) does not control a state-purchased
automobile insurance policy.
347. 662 F. Supp. 164 (N.D. W. Va. 1987).
348. Id. at 170.
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which requires that any insurance policy provisions conform to statutory requirements. 49 The Transamerica court reasoned that, because
UIM coverage is not mandatory, Bell v. State Farm does not apply to
UIM coverage.5 Transamerica also appears to be contrary to the
policy of Youler, which established a policy of full compensation for
injured parties. Is Transamerica wrongly decided? No, due to the
court's decision in Deel v. Sweeney,35 ' which held that the insurance
company may incorporate any provisions it likes into the UIM coverage which do not conflict with statutory mandates.352 Because UIM
coverage is optional, there are no statutory mandates with which to
conflict.
D. Inclusion and Exclusion
UM coverage is required in West Virginia, but UIM coverage is
not mandatory - it is optional. Thus, the statutory requirements which
are important in Bell v. State Farm only apply to UM coverage. As
the court held in Deel, UIM coverage is not mandatory, and thus insurance companies may choose those provisions which are incorporated
into UIM coverage.353 This different standard for UIM coverage is
the reason for the decisions in Transamerica Insurance Co. v.
Arbogast,5 4 Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Shambaugh,355 and
Thomas v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,356 discussed below.
There are several aspects of inclusion and exclusion in UIM cases.
The first of these is an "owned but not insured" exclusionary clause.
This type of exclusionary clause was held to be valid in
Transamerica.57 "Owned but not insured" clauses do not violate the
UIM statute where the insured demonstrates an understanding of the

349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.

Bell v. State Farm, 207 S.E.2d at 149.
Transamerica,662 F. Supp. at 171.
383 S.E.2d 92 (W. Va. 1989).
Id. at 94.
Deel, 383 S.E.2d at 92.
662 F. Supp. 164 (N.D. W. Va. 1987).
747 F. Supp. 1203 (N.D. W. Va. 1990).
425 S.E.2d 595 (W. Va. 1992).
Transamerica, 662 F. Supp. at 164.
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policy implications. 58 In Transamerica, the insured
motorcycle which was not an insured vehicle under
mobile liability policy.359 The insured demonstrated
of this exclusionary clause by purchasing motorcycle
through a different insurer than his UIM provider. 6 °

[Vol. 97:583

was injured on a
his standard autohis understanding
liability insurance

In Shambaugh, the northern district court heard an action for a
declaration that the insured's son was not a resident of the insured's
household within the meaning of the UIM policy coverage. 6 ' The action was brought by Aetna, which was attempting to exclude the son
from his father's UIM coverage. 62 The father's automobile insurance
policy contained a "covered persons" provision, which included "family
members." "Family members" were defined by the policy to include
"any perscn related by blood or marriage who is a resident of your
household including a ward or a foster child.""36 The question of
coverage for the son arose because his parents were divorced and his
mother, who n., longer resided with the insured father, had been granted physical custody.3" Aetna argued that the injured son could have
only one residence - with his mother - and, thus, the son could not
be considered a resident of the insured father's household. 5 The
northern district court held that "resident" is 4 more lenient standard
than the "domicile" standard proposed by Aetna, and that the injured
son should be considered to be a resident of his father's household
under the insurance policy. 66

358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id. See also Deel v. Sweeney, 383 S.E.2d 92 (W. Va. 1989) (holding that an
"owned but not insured" exclusion provision is valid under the UIM statute due to the optional nature of UIM coverage).
361. Shambaugh, 747 F. Supp. at 1203.
362. Id. at 1204.
363. Id.
364. Id. While the mother technically had physical custody of the injured son, the insured father spent a great deal of time with his son, the son stayed for extended periods of
time with his father, and the father spent some time in his ex-wife's home caring for his
son.
365. Id.
366. Shambaugh, 747 F. Supp. at 1204. The court stated that a person may have dualresidency under the plain meaning of the policy language, and thus the son could be considered a resident of both his mother's and his father's households.
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In Thomas,367 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
held that a "family use" exclusion is valid under the UIM statutes, and
that insurers may incorporate such terms, conditions, and exclusions in
automobile insurance policies as are consistent with the UIM statutory
provisions.368 Additionally, there is no UIM coverage for guest passengers where a policy excludes such payments,369 under the same
logic as Thomas.
E. Guest Clauses
An insurance company may exclude coverage for guests in a UIM
policy. 70 In Alexander v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co., the
court held that UIM coverage is not available to guest passengers "unless the statute or the policy language specifically provides for such
coverage."37 ' As in Deel, the Alexander court considered the nature
of UIM coverage as an optional, contracted-for-coverage provision, and
held that the insurer may incorporate such terms, conditions, and exclusions as may be consistent with the premium charged, so long as these
exclusions do not conflict with the "spirit and intent" of the UM and
UIM statutes.372 This decision is based on the notion that UIM coverage is "bargained for" by the insured, because of its optional nature;
thus, the insured has the choice to include guest coverage in his UIM
policy.373
A UIM policy which separately defines coverage for the owner,
spouse, or member of the insured's household, and for other persons
while occupying the insured vehicle with the consent of the insured,
creates two distinct classes of individuals. 4 Any guest passengers are
367. Thomas, 425 S.E.2d at 600.
368. Id.
369. Alexander v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 415 S.E.2d 618 (W. Va. 1992): But see
Starr v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 423 S.E.2d 922 (W. Va. 1992) (holding that a
guest passenger could receive UIM benefits under the insured's policy, but could not stack
these benefits).
370. Alexander, 415 S.E.2d at 618.
371. Id. at 625.
372. Id. See also Deel v. Sweeney, 383 S.E.2d 92, Syl. Pt. 3 (W. Va. 1989).
373. Alexander, 415 S.E.2d at 624.
374. Starr v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 423 S.E.2d 922 (W. Va. 1992). The
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included in the second class, consisting of the permissive users of the
named insured's vehicle. 7 In Starr, !he court held that a passenger
who was entitled to UIM benefits solely by virtue of riding in the
named insured's automobile could not stack the insured's UMIUIM
coverage on another vehicle which was not involved in the accident.376 Because West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(c) does not expressly
provide for the stacking of UIM provisions by a guest passenger, the
court reasoned that there was no legislative intent for UIM stacking by
a Class Two insured.377 Therefore, the insurer can successfully insert
an anti-stacking provision as to guests.
F. Stacking
Again, stacking of automobile insurance coverages refers to the
piling up of multiple coverages from multiple policies, or the piling up
of coverages of multiple vehicles in a single policy, when there is only
one loss. West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(b) articulates the legislature's
public policy of full indemnification or compensation for accident victins which underlies both UM and UIM coverage.378 Thus, the "preeminent public policy of this state" in UM or UIM cases provides that
"the injured person be fully compensated for his or her damages not
compensated by a negligent tortfeasor," up to the limits of UIM coverage. 79 Because of the policy of full indemnification, anti-stacking
clauses were found repugnant to the UIM statute in Youler, " ° making
anti-stacking language in automobile policies void under West Virginia
Code § 33-6-31(b). The insured may recover up to the amount of UIM

court held that W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(c) (1994) creates two classes of insureds for the
purposes of UM/UIM coverage. The first is the named insured, his or her spouse, and their
resident relatives (Class One). The second class consists of the permissive users of the
named insured's vehicle (Class Two). Starr, 423 S.E.2d at 926-28.
375. Starr, 423 S.E.2d at 925.
376. Id. at 928.
377. Id. In fact, the second UIM policy (for the automobile not involved in the accident) did not expressly provide for coverage for guests.
378. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(b) (1992); Youler, 396 S.E.2d at 745.
379. Youler, 396 S.E.2d at 745.
380. Id. See also W. VA. CODE § 33-6-17 (1992) (any insurance policy provision or
condition not complying with insurance statutes must yield to the statutory mandates).
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coverage, or up to the amount of the judgment obtained against the
financially irresponsible tortfeasor, whichever is less, as a result of one
accident and injury. 8
The question of an insurance bargain was addressed by the court
in Russell v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co." 2 The court
held that, where the insured bargains for a reduced premium price
through a multi-car discount, the insured receives the "benefit of the
bargain!"" and, in this instance, anti-stacking language is permitted.
To ensure that an anti-stacking clause will be upheld in a "bargain"
policy when there is a multi-car discount, the insurer should state
"clearly and unambiguously" the limits on the declarations page; the
limitation clause should make clear the maximum amount the insurer
will pay for UIM coverage for any one accident, regardless of the
number of insured vehicles or the number of premiums paid.384
In 1992, the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed its stance on
stacking. In Thomas v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,38 the court
held that anti-stacking language is not forbidden in a UIM policy under
West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(b). However, such anti-stacking language is subject to several conditions: there must be only a single
insurance policy; the policy can only be issued by a single insurer; the
exclusionary language must be a "family use exclusion;" and the insured must have bargained for an underinsured policy endorsement
even though the policy covers more than one vehicle.386 If the policy
does not meet the aforementioned requirements, then the Youler prohibition for anti-stacking clauses still applies.

381. Youler, 396 S.E.2d at 746.
382. 422 S.E.2d 803 (W. Va. 1992). See also Arbogast v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
427 S.E.2d 461 (W. Va. 1993) (holding that UIM stacking can be limited where there is a
multi-car discount).
383. Russell, 422 S.E.2d at 806-07.
384. Id. at 807.
385. 425 S.E.2d 595 (W. Va. 1992).
386. Id. at 597-601. See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ashley, 833 F. Supp. 583 (S.D. W.
Va. 1993) (holding that a policy provision which denied duplication of payments was valid
and that an insurer may preclude the stacking of UIM coverage when only one policy is involved).
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G. Set Off
West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(b) requires that the tortfeasor's
liability coverage must be set off against the amount of damages sustained by the injured insured, and not against the insured's UIM coverage limits." 7 This is so because the statutory language, "all sums...
as damages" evinces a public policy of full indemnification or compensation for those damages uncompensated by the financially irresponsible
tortfeasor."8 Thus, the UIM insurer is liable for the uncompensated
damages up to the insured's UIM coverage limits. 89 Any set-off language which purports to diminish these UIM benefits is void. 90
" ' the court considered the
In Johnson v. General Motors Corp.,39
effect of the collateral source rule on the offsetting of UIM benefits
payments. The 'collateral source rule' was established to prevent the
defendant from taking advantage of payments received by the [injured
party] as a result of the [injured party's] own contractual arrangements
'
[which are] entirely independent of the defendant."392
The rationale
for the rule is that a negligent tortfeasor should not be allowed to
minimize his damages by offsetting payments received by the
injured
9
party through that party's own independent arrangements.
Normal-

387. Youler, 396 S.E.2d at 748.
388. Id. at 748-49.
389. Id. at 749. In 1991, the southern district court considered a motion for relief of
judgment following the Youler decision. Dowell v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Auto. Ins.
Co., 774 F. Supp. 996 (S.D. W. Va. 1991). The original decision was taken on March 6,
1990, prior to the ruling in Youler. Approximately five months after the initial judgment, the
plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 6 opinion in light of the decision
in Youler which allowed for UIM recovery up to full indemnification. The southern district
court held that the decisional change which prevented UIM offsets did not represent a
change of law because there was no change in legislative intent; the court held that, under
Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a change in decisional law is not
grounds for relief of judgment. Id. at 1000-01.
390. Youler, 396 S.E.2d at 750. See Brown v. Crum, 400 S.E.2d 596 (W. Va. 1990)
(holding that the UIM statute precludes the offsetting of amounts paid by the tortfeasor's
insurance carrier against the UIM policy limits of the injured insured).
391. 438 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1993).
392. Id. at 36 (citing Ratlief v. Yokum, 280 S.E.2d 584 (W. Va. 1981) (defining the
collateral source rule as a preclusion to offsetting independently contracted for benefits)).
393. Johnson, 438 S.E.2d at 36.
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ly, the collateral source rule operates to preclude the offsetting of payments made by health and accident insurance companies, or other collateral sources, as against the damages claimed by the injured party."' In the Johnson case, General Motors attempted to minimize its
damages by offsetting the UIM settlement the Johnsons received as a
result of their own contractual insurance arrangements. The court held
that UIM benefits are a collateral source and, as such, may not be offset against any damages sought against a negligent tortfeasor" 5
H. Subrogation and Consent to Settle
West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(f) authorizes subrogation by the
UIM insurance company for the amount paid to an injured person by a
tortfeasor.396 An insurance company may either waive or use its subrogation rights mandated by this statute, depending on whether or not
the insurance company has given its insured the consent to settle.397
The court has held that a "consent to settle" provision pertaining to the
insured's UIM coverage is a valid and enforceable means by which an
insurer may protect its statutorily mandated right to subrogate
claims.398 Thus, an insured must first obtain written consent from his
insurer prior to settling a claim with the tortfeasor;399 this protects
the insurance company's subrogation rights against the tortfeasor."0
L

Statute of Limitations

A direct action against a UM insurer is a contract action governed
by the contract statute of limitations, which is ten years.4"' However,
the statute of limitations involving a UIM suit or a "John Doe" action
is two years. The UIM process is identical to the UM process.4"2 In
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Postlethwait v. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co., 432 S.E.2d 802 (W. Va. 1993).
397. Amdt v. Burdette, 434 S.E.2d 394, 399 (W. Va. 1993).

398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 400.
401. Plumley v. May, 434 S.E.2d 406 (W. Va. 1993).
402. See supra notes 288-292 and accompanying text
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Plumley v. May, °3 the court addressed the issue of a direct action
against a UM or UIM insurer, and held that a plaintiff is not precluded
from suing his UIM insurer if the plaintiff has settled with the
tortfeasor's liability insurer for the full amount of the policy and where
the plaintiff has obtained from his UIM insurer a waiver of said
insurer's right of subrogation against the tortfeasor.
J Process, Suit, and Joinder
The West Virginia UIM statute does not authorize a direct action
against the UIM insurance company by its insured. 4 In order for the
UIM insured to bring suit against his insurer, a judgment against the
negligent tortfeasor must first be obtained," 5 or the UIM insured
must settle with the tortfeasor's liability insurer with the approval of
the UIM insurer." 6
In State ex rel. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Karl,"7 the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia outlined the relationship between
the UIM insurance company and the tortfeasor's liability insurance
company during the accident litigation. The UIM insurer was held to
be an excess insurer, with the tortfeasor's liability insurer holding the
place of primary insurer.40 8 In State ex rel. State Auto Mutual Insurance Co. v. Steptoe, °9 the court considered the issue of the UIM
insurer's right to participate in litigation and held that there is no absolute right of the UIM insurer to participate in the tortfeasor's litigation
defense. In fact, the court held that the UIM insurer had no absolute
right to file pleadings on behalf of a tortfeasor who had liability coverage and was being defended by a liability insurance company.4 °

403. Plumley, 434 S.E.2d at 409-10.
404. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(d) (1992).
405. Plumley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 772 F. Supp. 922, 924 (S.D. W. Va. 1991).
406. Id. See also Davis v. Robertson, 332 S.E.2d 819 (W. Va. 1985); Lee v. Saliga,
373 S.E.2d 345 (W. Va. 1988).
407. 437 S.E.2d 749 (W. Va. 1993).
408. Id. at 751.
409. 438 S.E.2d 54, 58 (W. Va. 1993).
410. Id. The court based its holding on W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(d) (1992).
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Choice of Law

In general, the law of the state in which the insurance contract is
formed governs the suit.4 ' However, where West Virginia has "significant contacts" to the injury and the accident at issue, the laws of
West Virginia may be applied, even where the usurance contract was
formed in another state. 2
The southern district court considered substantive law application
involving conflicts of law and forum non conveniens in Nowsco Well
Service, Ltd. v. Home Insurance Co."3 In Nowsco, a Canadian insured alleged breach of insurance contract for a policy entered into in
Canada.4 14 The court reasoned that it is fundamental for a federal
district court to apply the law of the state in which it sits;41 5 however, this traditional rule was modified by the historical application, in
West Virginia, of the law of the state in which the insurance contract
was formed (in this case, Canada). 6 The court looked to a more recent decision, Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Triangle Industries,
Inc., in order to determine the source of substantive law interpretations. The court in Liberty Mutual held that the state in which the
contract was formed had the controlling law unless (1) West Virginia
had a more significant relationship to the transaction or to the parties
or (2) the law is contrary to the public policy of this state.41 The
Nowsco court held that the plaintiffs case did not fall under either of
the exceptions, thus the law of the state of contract formation ap-

411. Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 421 S.E.2d 493 (W. Va. 1992).
412. Id. at 497. See also Nadler v. Liberty Mut Fire Ins. Co., 424 S.E.2d 256 (W.
Va. 1992) (holding that the laws of the state in which the contract was formed apply unless
another state has a more significant relationship to the transaction and the parties); Nadler v.
Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 770 F. Supp. 294 (S.D. W. Va. 1990) (holding that the law of
the state in which the contract was formed generally, but not always, governs).
413. 799 F. Supp. 602 (S.D. W. Va. 1991).
414. Id. at 604.
415. Id. at 605 (relying on Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
416. Id. at 606 (relying on the "Mattingly Rule" of Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Mattingly,
212 S.E.2d 754 (W. Va. 1975)).
417. 390 S.E.2d 562 (NV. Va. 1990).
418. Nowsco, 799 F. Supp. at 606 (citing Liberty Mutual, 390 S.E.2d at 567).
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plied." 9 Additionally, the court considered the question of forum non
conveniens,42 which refers to the discretionary power of the courts to
decline jurisdiction where the interests of justice would be better served
if the action were brought in another forum.421 The court considered
the alternative forum options, and the burden of switching forums for
the plaintiff, and concluded that the case should be dismissed on the
ground of forum non conveniens. 4"
Finally, in considering the "full faith and credit" issue, the court
has held that West Virginia's courts may not refuse to enforce another
state court's judgment merely because that judgment involves some
contravention of the forum state's public policy.4"
L. Notice Requirements
As with UM insurance, the UIM insured has a duty to provide
reasonable notice to his UIM insurance company when he is involved
in an accident.424 The notice must be provided within a reasonable
time period.4" In the typical case of inadequate notice, the insured
must present evidence showing the reason for the delay in giving notice.426 Once this prerequisite is satisfied, the insurer must demon-

419. Id. at 611.
420. Id.

421.

BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 452 (6th ed. 1991).
422. Nowsco, 799 F. Supp. at 615. The court required that the dismissal be conditioned
upon the plaintiff's ability to achieve jurisdiction and service of process over the defendant
in the Canadian judicial system. Id.
423. Clark v. Rockwell, 435 S.E.2d 664 (W. Va. 1993). The full faith and credit
clause, U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 1, requires each state to give effect to the official acts of
sister states, including judgments entered in sister states if that state had jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter.
424. Youler, 396 S.E.2d at 742-43. "Reasonableness" of the notice is an issue for the
finder of fact. Id. at 742.
425. Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Voshel, 428 S.E.2d 542 (W. Va. 1993). In a UIM case,
prejudice to the investigative interests of the insurer is a factor to be considered, along with
the reasons for the delay and the length of delay in notification, in determining the overall
reasonableness in giving notice of an accident While the court provided no specific defmition of the term "reasonableness," the Dairyland court did expressly state that an "almost
two-year" delay did not appear to be reasonable. Id. at 546.
426. Id
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strate that prejudice resulted from the insured's failure to give timely
notice; if the insurer fails to present evidence of prejudice, the
insured's failure to give timely notice will not bar recovery.427 However, if the insurer does present evidence of prejudice, then the reasonableness of the insured's failure to notify becomes an issue for the trier
of fact.428 If prejudice is shown, the insured will be barred from
making a claim. 429
VII.

CONCLUSION

Automobile insurance policy questions present a series of quandaries for the practicing attorney - the importance of an organized approach in researching and reviewing your client's case cannot be
stressed enough. First, the insurance policy provisions should be considered, paying particular attention to the express wording of the provisions and the context in which they are written. Next, closely read the
controlling statutes as they apply to the policy provisions. Then, review
the insurance regulations promulgated by the Insurance Commissioner's
office."' Only after these initial steps have been performed should
the attorney then turn to the case law. Additionally, the public policy
should be gleaned from the statutes, regulations, and cases in order for
the attorney to comprehend the whole picture. Finally, the national
norms of automobile insurance policy laws should be considered.431
Be prepared for several surprises along the way - insurance adjusters,
statutes, and case law do not always follow a common sense direc432
tion.
427. Id.
428. Id. See also Youler, 396 S.E.2d at 745.
429. Dairyland, 332 S.E.2d at 546.
430. See W. VA. INS. REGS. §§ 114-3-1 to -3 (1990).
431. Consider the following excellent treatises: WIDISS, supra note 2; IRVIN E.
SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LLABILrrY INsuRANCE (2nd ed. 1981); ROBERT R. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW (1988); COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D (Rev. ed. 1982);
APPLEMAN, supra note 20.
432. See, e.g., Johnson v. Continental Casualty Co., 201 S.E.2d 292 (W. Va. 1973)
(where the policy provision expressly excluded guests, in flat contradiction to West Virginia
Code § 33-6-29 (1992)); Perkins v. Doe, 350 S.E.2d 711 (W. Va. 1986) (holding that Virginia law applied, in a case where the insurance contract was formed in West Virginia and
the injured insureds resided in West Virginia, in order to grant recovery to the insureds).
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Insurance law is governed by three important interests - the eternal triangle of insurance law - insurance company provisions; legislative and administrative law; and judicial regulation of the insurance
industry. Insurance companies operate in their own self-interest with
the objective of making a profit. The legislative and administrative
branches of insurance law operate as the neutral go-between, creating
laws which form a consensus between the insurance industry and the
consumer.4 33 The judiciary most often operates in an oversight capacity, regulating insurance industry conduct as it affects consumers.434
Attorneys should consider not only the express language of the policy
provisions, statutes, regulations, and case law, but also its source.
West Virginia's automobile liability insurance is fairly straightforward and consistent with the national norms. Most areas of liability
insurance are either covered by, or related to, an express statutory
provision. West Virginia's case law contains some liberal decisions
expanding the recovery for the injured victim;435 however, the court
has also issued some fairly conservative decisions which have reduced
the amount of allowable recovery.436 The biggest disappointment in the
liability area is the lack of a Tulley/Bell equivalent. Liability insurance
is mandatory, but is not subject to the same statutory strictures as UM
insurance. This should be remedied.
Currently, MEDPAY is under the control of the insurance industry.
MEDPAY insurance needs legislative control and a Tulley/Bell
equivalent as the present system of insurance company control does not

433. See W. VA. CODE § 33-20-1 (1992) (stating that the purpose of regulating insurance rates is to be certain that the rates are not excessive (pro-consumer); inadequate (proinsurance industry); or unfairly discriminatory (neutral) in their application),
434. See, e.g., Justice Neeley's dissent in Jarrett v. E. L. Harper & Sons, Inc., 235
S.E.2d 362, 366 (W. Va. 1977), wherein Justice Neely opined that, "[s]ome of the bandits
in the insurance business, a minority I am happy to point out, predicate their company policy on the proposition that a person cannot sue them, realistically, for property damage. They
offer settlements accordingly."
435. See, e.g., supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text (discussing Taylor's "initial
permission rule"); supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing Hensley's punitive
damages allowance).
436. See supra notes 139-140 and accompanying text (discussing Shamblin's "no stacking" decision); supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text (discussing Karlet's restriction of
loss of consortium recovery to the "per person" limits).
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provide adequate protection for the public interest. Because many West
Virginia residents lack medical coverage, protection of MEDPAY coverage in automobile accident cases is sorely needed. However, insurance industry control of MEDPAY is mitigated by MEDPAY policy
language which tends to be "boiler-plate" - consumers are offered a
choice of substantially similar provisions which are differentiated only
by pennies. Subrogation presents the most problems for practitioners,
especially in the areas of "fair share" reductions,437 spill-over from
UM coverage due to the "made-whole rule," and the denial of selfsubrogation for insurance companies who represent both the plaintiff
and the tortfeasor.438
UM is controlled by the Tulley/Bell premise, which enforces statutory conformity and voids any provisions which either conflict with or
are not expressly permitted by statute. Because UM coverage is controlled by fairly well-written code provisions, it presents few conceptual problems for the practitioner. The last truly difficult loophole was
closed by Norman,439 which defined a "hit-and-run" accident as one
which involved a close and substantial physical nexus.
UIM coverage is required to be offered by an insurer, but is not
mandatory and may be rejected by the insured - the named insured
decides the extent of his or her coverage. Therefore, UIM is less necessary to have than UM, but both are covered by the same statutory
treatment. Hence, there is tension between the Deel decision, allowing
the insured to choose the extent of UIM coverage, and the Tulley/Bell
premise, requiring conformity with statutory requirements. This tension
should be resolved.
This Article comprises a survey of four major portions of West
Virginia's automobile insurance policy law: liability; MEDPAY; UM;

437. See Arnold, supra notes 179-181 and accompanying text.
438. See Richards, supra notes 188-190 and accompanying text.
439. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Norman, 446 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va. 1994).
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and UIM insurance. We have not covered the issues of collision insurance, comprehensive coverage, and insurance company claim misconduct, but have left these for another day. This Article is intended as a
primer on automobile insurance policy law in this state. While it covers a great deal of ground, attorneys should be aware that the true
work only starts here.
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